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Abstract
Introduction: Historically, psychosis, or schizophrenia, has been regarded as a
biologically explained illness of an enduring deteriorating course. The absence of
conclusive evidence regarding its biological nature, however, has led to the
proposals of psychological models of psychosis, most recently, psychosis as a
disorder of blocked adolescent development (Harrop & Trower, 2001). It was
hypothesised that the roles of adult versus adolescent onset; depressive and anxious
core beliefs; current emotional dysfunction; and traumatic symptomatology, would
be predictive of beliefs about illness and recovery style in psychosis.
Method: A total of 26 adolescents with psychosis and 17 individuals whose first
episode of psychosis was after the age of 25 completed the questionnaires used to
test the research hypotheses. A single case study illustrates both the theory of
psychosis as a disorder of adolescent development, and the proposed, quantitatively
tested model of the role of core beliefs in illness beliefs and recovery style.
Results: Independent /-tests indicated there were no significant differences between
adult and adolescent onset psychosis regarding each of these factors. Multiple
regressions analyses indicated that current anxiety is the only significant predictor of
beliefs about illness. Excluding the contribution of current anxiety, a further model
with anxious and depressive core beliefs as predictors of illness beliefs approached
significance. None of the proposed factors were correlated with or, therefore,
predictive of recovery style.
Discussion: Findings require cautious interpretation given limited sample size and
difficulties recruiting to the adult onset group. Although the quantitative findings do
not indicate differences between groups, the case study illustrates the complexity of
adolescent psychosis and demonstrates the utility of a developmental
psychopathological framework in studying these phenomena.
Conclusion: Further research of the role of core beliefs in adjustment to psychosis
is warranted. It might be appropriate to review the concepts of recovery and illness
beliefs, perhaps using qualitative research methodologies, to broaden the
understanding of individuals' experiences of psychosis and thus promote recovery.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to literature review
For many, be they clinicians, researchers, service users or their relatives, psychosis
remains a biologically explained illness, characterised by positive symptoms of
delusions and hallucinations and negative symptoms of flattened affect and
decreased functioning.
The aim of this thesis is to focus on a developmentally-based formulation for
psychosis, examining how individuals' views of themselves and the world affect
their views of the experience of psychosis and recovery style. In relation to this, a
central aim of this thesis is to determine whether there are differences between
adolescent and adult onset of psychosis, in terms of precipitating factors for the
illness, and whether these may be two separate entities caught under the same
umbrella.
Firstly, a brief historical review of the literature sets the scene for some of the current
debates around schizophrenia and psychosis, including moving beyond the
problematic, traditional medical model of disease to other psychological models.
Focusing on a developmental formulation of psychosis, the notion that anxious and
depressive beliefs have a central, predisposing role in psychosis will be discussed.
Such core beliefs may shape beliefs about the experience of psychosis and are likely
factors in determining adjustment to, and recovery, from psychosis.
Similarly, different pathways to emotional dysfunction in psychosis will be
discussed. Emotional distress has been implicated in the development, maintenance
and adjustment to psychosis, with 75% of individuals with psychosis reporting
significant anxiety and 80% reporting depression (Freeman et al., 2001).
Furthermore, given the estimate of 43% of individuals with psychosis reporting
PTSD (e.g. Meuser et ah, 1998), and the significant overlap between symptoms of
PTSD and psychosis (e.g. Morrison et ah, 2003), a review of the different potential
relationships between the experience of trauma and psychosis is warranted.
Finally, of the 1 in 100 people who experience psychosis at some point in their
lifetime (Jablensky, 1997), 50-80% do so during late adolescence or early adulthood
(Sartorius et ah, 1986). Whilst some literature has suggested no differences between
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adolescent and adult onset of psychosis (e.g. Basso et al., 1997), other research has
(e.g. Menezes & Milovan, 2000). Most recently, it has been suggested that, in some
cases, psychosis may be a consequence of disordered adolescent development,
(Harrop & Trower, 2003), and literature on differences and similarities between adult
and adolescent psychosis will be reviewed.
In summary, this study seeks to look at psychosis within a developmental
formulation framework, and to examine what factors are important in determining
beliefs about illness and recovery style. Its second central aim is to examine
differences between adolescent and adult-onset psychosis.
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1.1 - The (mis)conception of schizophrenia
In 1896, Emil Kraepelin outlined the concept of dementia praecox, later renamed
schizophrenia by Eugene Bleuler. After its existence for the past 100 years, one
might expect that this construct has stood the test of time and its original description
remained unchanged, in much the same way that a Victorian engineer's
understanding of the workings of a steam engine would still hold today.
Alternatively, and perhaps more in line with the ever-changing nature of knowledge,
one might think that the years have allowed, as the history of psychiatry might
suggest, "gradual unravelling of scientific truths about naturally occurring kinds of
mental disorder" (Bentall, 1990, p. xv) and that consequently, after decades of
research, the concept of schizophrenia is better understood than ever before.
Neither position is an accurate reflection of the past or present of the schizophrenia
concept. Boyle (1990) criticises Kraepelin's original thesis for failing to provide
sufficient evidence to support his original syndrome of dementia praecox, and for its
unsound proposition that all cases of dementia praecox had a similar onset, course
and outcome. Kraepelin himself later abandoned the idea of similar outcome,
perhaps taking on board the views of his contemporary Bleuler, who was of the
opinion that outcome was not always negative, which led to the change in
nomenclature. However in changing what were essentially the defining criteria of
schizophrenia, Boyle (1990) points out that Kraepelin failed to acknowledge the
implications that this had for the syndrome - altering the original defining criteria
raises questions as to whether the same syndrome can be maintained as a valid and
reliable construct. Moreover, the later extrapolations and reconceptualisations of
schizophrenia, for example by Schneider (1959) with his emphasis on first rank
positive symptoms over other difficulties, may be problematic given the questionable
foundations on which they are based.
In order to retain the concept of schizophrenia, Bentall (1990) proposes that it would
need to be shown to be a usefully reliable and valid scientific concept, "one
psychiatrist's schizophrenic must be another psychiatrist's schizophrenic" (p.25).
However, as he discusses, the reliability of the concept is very much open to
question, as it is not uncommon for different psychiatrists to diagnose the same
person with different disorders. Bleuler regarded the 'loosening of associations' -
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disordered thinking or discourse - as the central feature of schizophrenia, whereas
Schneider held that only a proportion of individuals had such difficulties, and that
delusions and hallucinations were the most important symptoms diagnostically. It has
been argued that this confusion persists, as it is possible for two or three individuals
to have completely different symptoms and yet the same diagnosis of schizophrenia
(Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988).
As regards construct validity, there is evidence to suggest that there is no clear
division between affective and schizophrenic disorders (e.g. Brockington and
Wainright, 1980; Bentall, 2003). With regard to predictive validity, an individual
having one symptom of a disorder should have a high probability of experiencing
other symptoms of the same disorder. However, as research cited above has shown,
in schizophrenia this is often not the case. Furthermore, diagnosis is commonly
regarded as directing treatment and thus predicting outcome - however outcome is
variable in those given a diagnosis of schizophrenia, with a third recovering, a third
experiencing repeated episodes of psychosis and a third deteriorating into chronic
states (Ciompi, 1981).
With regard to aetiology, a large number of potential causal agents have been
implicated in schizophrenia, including genetic endowment, abnormalities of brain
structure or chemistry, diet, season of birth, hypothetical viral agents, social stress,
life events or family structure (Bentall, 1990). Yet conclusive proof of the role of one
or a combination of these variables in the aetiology of schizophrenia remains elusive.
Bentall posits that this should not be surprising, "given that schizophrenia appears to
be a disorder with no particular symptoms, no particular course, no particular
outcome and which responds to no particular treatment" (1990, p. 33).
1.2- Reconstructions of schizophrenia
Although it has been argued that schizophrenia is not a meaningful scientific
concept, critics of the concept plainly acknowledge that people who report having
experiences which are regarded as symptoms of schizophrenia are clearly suffering
from a "profound loss of well-being" (Claridge, 1990, p. 179) and may thus require
the care of professional services. This move from an aetiological to a functional
descriptive framework of schizophrenia has ramifications for the meaning of care:
treatment or intervention which aims to manage or alleviate individual's symptoms is
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necessarily based on the conceptions of the causes, course and consequences of the
disorder.
As described above, a number of researchers have highlighted the flaws of the
traditional model of schizophrenia. This is not a new suggestion. The anti-psychiatry
movement of the 1960s, led by R.D. Laing, proposed that schizophrenia was the
result, not of neurological dysfunction which required pharmocotherapy, but of the
social and psychological circumstances of victimised or labelled individuals (Laing,
1960). Although regarded as out of date by some researchers (e.g. Harrop & Trower,
2003), vestiges of these theories remain popular with some clients due to their
empowering qualities. Furthermore, they invite and encourage debate about the
breadth of factors beyond the biological that may be involved in the development and
maintenance of the difficulties that face people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.
It has been suggested that schizophrenia is not a unitary disease entity and that it
may, in fact, represent a heterogeneous set of pathological processes that manifest
themselves in broadly similar syndromes, notwithstanding the variation of symptoms
within schizophrenia cited above (e.g. Basso et al., 1997; Murray et ah, 1992; Tsuang
& Farone, 1995). Thus schizophrenia may be best characterised as an umbrella term
for a spectrum of disorders, with overlapping groups of symptoms but potentially
different aetiologies. This variation may well have implications for course, outcome
and most effective treatment of difficulties. As is discussed below, age at onset of
difficulties has been identified as a potential distinguishing characteristic between
different subtypes of this hypothesised spectrum disorder.
1.2.1 - Problems with terminology
Given the conceptual problems of schizophrenia (or schizophrenias), the continued
use of a term with negative connotations and the implication that individuals have
some as yet unidentified brain disease with an enduring deteriorating course, many
researchers and clinicians (e.g. Harrop & Trower, 2003) use the less stigmatising
term psychosis instead, which also includes those difficulties which would be
diagnosed as bipolar disorder, schizo-affective disorder and related disorders.
In line with Mueser and colleagues' (1998) approach, and due to limited research in
this area, the present thesis seeks to study as broad a sample as possible while
imposing minimal diagnostic criteria for inclusion in the study. Thus, for the
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purposes of this thesis the term psychosis includes diagnostic categories such as
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bi-polar affective disorder, affective
psychosis and non-affective psychosis. Participants in this study will all have
experienced psychotic symptomatology, although their diagnoses may be different.
That there is a great degree of diagnostic instability with adolescents - Menezes and
Milovan's (2000) review indicates that there are high rates of change (40-50%) of
initial diagnosis - provides further support for the use of broad inclusion criteria to
maximise the number of participants.
1.2.2 - Current models of psychosis
A classic theory of biologically oriented psychosis research is that a reduced
temporal lobe size is implicated in individuals' psychotic symptomatology (e.g.
Johnstone et al., 1976). However, Harrop and colleagues (1996) argue that many of
the findings which result from this approach to studying psychosis are flawed
methodologically, and they point out, furthermore, that attempts to replicate such
findings have failed (Jernigan et al., 1982). In any case, the duration of untreated
psychosis is on average 12 months (Beiser et al., 1993), which leaves open the
question of whether physical changes were present before symptom onset or whether
they resulted from associated psychological difficulties. Prospective studies which
have endeavoured to examine this have not been supportive of previous research,
with findings contrary to the neurodevelopmental model that psychosis results from
lesions with their origins in the early years of life (Phillips et al., 2002).
Biological theorists of schizophrenia propose that psychological symptoms result
from changes in the central nervous system. However, this presents an explanatory
gap - such an inference does not indicate how biology effects cognitive organisation.
An alternative proposition (Bentall, 1990) is that research should focus on symptoms
of functional impairment and distress, namely: hallucinations, delusions, disordered
discourse and negative symptoms, before trying to link cognitive (dis)organisation to
potentially causal biological or environmental factors.
Current conventional wisdom tends toward an interactionist explanation for
psychosis, thus holding on to the notion that psychosis is at least in part biologically
determined. An example of this is Neuchterlein's (1987) stress-vulnerability model
where stress is seen to precipitate psychotic episodes in individuals who have a
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predisposing biological vulnerability. From a developmental perspective, which will
be discussed in more detail below, predisposing vulnerabilities need not be solely
biological in nature - aversive early experiences, such as attachment problems or
traumata, may impact on individuals abilities to handle stress, through the
development of dysfunctional assumptions about self and others. Whether
predisposers are biological, environmental or a combination thereof, this model
allows for individual differences, whereby either a large loading on the predisposing
factor combined with a small amount of stress may result in symptoms, or the role of
the predisposing factor might be minimal but the level of stress overwhelming. An
exemplar of the latter would be the journalist Brain Keenan (Keenan, 1993), who,
after being held hostage by terrorists for an extended period of time in horrendous
circumstances, began to experience auditory hallucinations. The role of stress or
trauma in psychosis warrants further discussion and will be explored at greater depth
in section 1.6.
1.2.3 - Alternative models of psychosis
Recently, alternative explanations of the development of psychosis have been put
forward (Harrop, Trower & Mitchell, 1996; Harrop & Trower, 2003). These
researchers propose that all of the neurobiological differences in psychosis - for
example, ventricular enlargement and reduced hippocampal volume (Johnstone et al.,
1976) - may result from the symptoms of psychosis. Rather than offering a basic
reversal of the biomedical theories, Harrop and Trower (2003) eschew causal
mechanistic explanations and posit that the biological and psychological factors work
in a reciprocal and iterative fashion, suggesting that both biological and
psychological differences may be thought of as emergent properties of this dynamic
interchange.
This allows for the re-interpretation of some of the cognitive information processing
models of psychosis which have often been linked somewhat erroneously to
unknown biological factors. Helmsley's (1987) deficit - that people with psychosis
are less able to interpret perceptual data using stored memories and thus have a
heightened awareness of irrelevant stimuli which leads to bizarre perceptual
experiences such as hallucinations - has been interpreted as anomalies at a neural
level leading to cognitive disorganisation, ultimately resulting in psychotic
symptomatology (Gray, 1993).
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Using an active mix of social factors and neural level dysfunction to account for
Helmsley's deficit, or Frith's (1992) notion of "meta-(mis)representing" - that
people with psychosis have difficulties with attributing ownership to thoughts or
intentions - is congruent with the reciprocal and iterative loop of psychosis.
Social learning experiences impact on nascent emotional and cognitive structures,
which are necessarily rooted neurally. These emerging structures, in turn, influence
the future socialisation experiences of individuals, who are active agents in their
social environment. The reciprocal and iterative cycle continues as further
experiences impact on developing intrapsychic and neural structures. A model
accounting for such transactional processes, between experience and meaning
making throughout an individual's life, is further described in the following section.
1.3 - A developmental psychopathological model of
psychosis
The developmental psychopathology paradigm seeks to investigate "the mysterious
unfolding of disturbance through time, the integration of person and environmental
characteristics in the generation of psychological disturbance through ontogenetic
development" (Fonagy, 2003, p. 215). In doing so, developmental psychopathology
draws on theories of cognitive psychology and social learning, and also retains a
psychodynamic perspective, with particular reference to attachment and
individuation experiences.
The model that this paradigm suggests is particularly appropriate for the
conceptualisation of psychosis for a number of reasons. Firstly, between fifty to
eighty per cent of people who develop psychosis do so in late adolescence or early
adulthood (Sartorius et al., 1986).
Secondly, developmental psychopathology investigates the dynamic changes
occurring at and between both the personal level (intrapsychically and
ontogenetically) and the objects in an individual's environment. With this latter
point in mind, there is a particular emphasis on socialisation experiences, particularly
intrafamilial socialisation and early attachment experiences, and also peer
attachments. This is similar to Harrop and Trower's (2003) reciprocal and iterative
loop explanation of the development of psychosis, with its focus on the consequences
of the continual interchange between the biological and psychological.
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Thirdly, the emotional aspects of psychotic experience, which some regard as central
to psychosis and will be discussed further in the following section, can be usefully
integrated into a developmental psychopathology conceptualisation. Birchwood
(2003) proposes that emotional disorder in first-episode psychosis involves
emotional disturbance triggered by an emerging psychosis, childhood trauma or both.
This in turn leads to or activates dysfunctional beliefs that hamper adaptation to
psychosis and its symptoms, and precipitates adolescent emotional disorders that
continue into adulthood. Thus a developmental psychopathology paradigm is able to
integrate within a transactional framework the various personal and environmental
factors that are key to understanding psychosis.
The following sections of this literature review, regarding emotional dysfunction,
trauma and psychosis, and adolescent development will make reference to this
paradigm which provides a context for the key research questions of this thesis:
namely, exploring the relationship between people's beliefs about themselves and
others, their experience of psychosis and their adjustment to their experience.
1.4 - Emotional dysfunction in psychosis
A model that accounts for affect is particularly useful given the prominent place of
emotional functioning in individuals' experience of psychosis. The nature of
psychotic symptomatology tends to be either emotionally-laden or there is a
complete absence of affect - it is rare for emotionally neutral psychotic experiences
to be reported as problematic. Harrop and colleagues (1996, p. 650) state that "
...any account of hallucinations and delusions that does not account for the very
emotional nature of most of them is sadly deficient". That 80% of people with
psychosis have moderate levels of depression and 75% are anxious (Freeman et al.,
2001) emphasises the importance of accounting for emotional dysfunction in
psychosis.
The cognitive information processing models of psychosis, briefly described above,
not only propose ideas regarding formation and maintenance of (predominantly
positive) symptoms, namely, that perceptual and reasoning biases are involved in
processing both self and social information. Further to this, Garety and colleagues
(2001) propose that affective disturbance also has a significant role in independently
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influencing this information processing, ultimately "[contributing] to the
maintenance of the psychotic appraisal" (p. 192).
Despite its clear existence for people with psychosis, their families and those who
work with them, emotional dysfunction - depression, social anxiety, or traumatic
symptoms - has sat uneasily with the concept of schizophrenia. Although, along
with disordered thinking, Bleuler originally regarded emotional disturbance as
central to the concept, other later influential psychiatrists such as Schneider (1959)
held that positive symptoms were key, and that any emotional difficulties were a
result of a co-morbid mood disorder rather than part of schizophrenia. Persisting to
this day is the seemingly paradoxical nature of emotional dysfunction in non-
affective psychosis.
1.4.1 - Potential pathways of emotional disorder in psychosis
Birchwood (2003; Birchwood et al., 2004) describes three core but not mutually
exclusive pathways of emotional dysfunction in psychosis, and a brief description of
these follows.
The first is that emotional disorder is intrinsic to the psychosis diathesis, evidenced
by the frequent presence of depression in the first episode prodrome, which then
recedes with the positive symptomatology. Social anxiety and social avoidance,
often present along with active psychotic symptomatology, may also be part and
parcel of the positive symptoms of psychosis themselves.
Secondly, emotional dysfunction may be a psychological reaction to psychosis. It is
not psychotic experiences per se that generate distress, rather it is people's evaluation
and the meaning they make of these experiences that determines their ability to cope
and their consequent emotional functioning. Iqbal and colleagues (2000) found that
with a sample of adults with psychosis, aged between 18 and 65, individuals'
appraisals of psychosis as a loss of social goals and status led to feelings of shame,
and then subsequently to a sense of being trapped by mental illness, which resulted in
post psychotic depression (PPD) and hopelessness. Jackson and Iqbal (2000)
propose that the processes that underlie social anxiety and avoidance, namely
feelings of social shame and fear of discovery by others, may well be the same as
those that result in anxiety in psychosis.
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Birchwood's third proposal is that emotional disorder arises from developmental
anomalies and trauma. Congruent with a developmental psychopathology paradigm,
social difficulties and emotional problems, in addition to low level psychotic
experience stretching back to adolescence, are often found to precede first episode
psychosis (Poulton et ah, 2000). Rutter (2000) found that the continuity between the
characteristics of adolescent and adult psychosis characteristics, including depression
and suicide risk, were influenced by social and familial context. More positively,
Rutter also found that there was considerable dis-continuity between adolescent and
adult emotional functioning - disturbed developmental trajectories can be realigned
as a result ofpositive life events in late adolescence.
These hypothesised pathways of emotional disorder in psychosis can be integrated in
a developmental model. Core beliefs are shaped by the interplay of earlier
socialisation experiences, the meaning made of them, and further experiences of the
self in the world. Aversive earlier experiences, in the absence of sufficient more
positive experiences, may lead to the development of maladaptive core beliefs.
These beliefs then predispose individuals to emotional dysfunction. Whether an
integral part of psychosis, a psychological reaction to it or a combination thereof,
emotional dysfunction is hypothesised to be associated with the meaning made of the
experience of psychosis, and presumably earlier adverse or traumatic experiences.
1.5 - Core beliefs and psychosis
Core beliefs about the self, world or future are likely predisposing factors for a
person's susceptibility to emotional distress. Assumed to have developed as a result
of earlier experiences, these beliefs are regarded by some as central to individuals'
proneness to psychosis, their beliefs about their difficulties, and adaptation to them
(Siddle & Haddock, 2004; Perris & Skagerland, 1994; Birchwood et ah, 2004).
Escher and colleagues (2002) found that the core beliefs of people with psychosis
affected emotional functioning. Adolescents' appraisals of the power and persistence
of voices, as influenced by their beliefs, were found to be associated with distress.
Siris (1995) reports a lower prevalence of depression in those with multiple
admissions for psychosis in contrast to first episode psychosis cases. To account for
this difference, Jackson and Iqbal (2000) cite Teasdale's (1998) proposal that
negative beliefs may be maintaining and modulating factors for depression, rather
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than precipitants or predisposers. Birchwood and colleagues (2000) propose that
those who have experienced repeated episodes of psychosis may have had longer to
adapt to psychosis and the mechanisms that modulate the onset of post-psychotic
depression than those experiencing their first episode of psychosis. However,
previous research led Birchwood (Birchwood et al., 1993) to suggest the near
opposite, that depression in chronic psychoses might result from the sense of
hopelessness, the risk of relapse and the concomitant functional and social
impairments, such as unemployment, engendered by repeated episodes. While some
evidence (e.g. Siris, 1995) suggests that the prevalence of depression is lower in
multiple episodic psychosis, at an overall incidence of 80% (Freeman et ah, 2001)
depressive symptomatology remains a difficulty for the majority of those who
experience psychotic episodes. Thus, the roles of core beliefs in psychosis and, as
explored in later sections, adjustment to the experience, warrant further investigation
with regard to early and later episodes.
It has been proposed that dysfunctional assumptions, which are necessarily based on
core beliefs, result from people's meaning-making of the experience of psychosis
(Fowler et ah, 1995). As described in the following section, people with psychosis
have often experienced a number of stressful events throughout their life. The latent
maladaptive beliefs, which may have developed from the meaning made of previous
aversive experiences, may be activated by particular life events, such as psychosis.
One potential explanation of this process is Parker and colleagues' (1998) "lock and
key" hypothesis, where adverse earlier experiences effect individuals' vulnerability
to depression - a "lock" - which is unlocked when individuals are exposed to life
events - or "keys" - that are similar to the original adversity. Parker's findings do
not particularly support the specificity of locks and keys, that is earlier parental
rejection is not closely tied to emotional disorder triggered by later interpersonal
rejection. Rather, a number of keys could open up a number of locks, which means
that emotional disorder, or indeed psychosis, may be triggered by any adverse life
event in the context of earlier adverse experiences.
It has been proposed (e.g. Birchwood et al., 2004) that as the prodromal period is
often marked by social isolation and interpersonal difficulty, this may lead to the
development of maladaptive self and other beliefs which are then activated post
onset of psychosis. As discussed later, degrees of social isolation and interpersonal
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difficulties are part of normative adolescent development, thus it could be that the
experience of psychosis impacts negatively on these forming views of self and
others. One possible mechanism for the negative impact of psychosis on adolescent
development might be the consequent lack of opportunity for the social learning
experiences that would allow the development ofmore adaptive beliefs.
Fowler, Garrety and Kuipers (1995) propose that there are common themes running
through the dysfunctional assumptions of people with psychosis. While
acknowledging that there will be variation from person to person, these authors
describe five themes, namely: that the self is vulnerable to harm or to losing self-
control, or is doomed to social isolation. A further theme includes the belief in
inner defectiveness, that they are to blame for their difficulties and are in some way
inherently flawed. A final theme includes the belief in unrelenting standards, which
is often associated with grandiose ideation. This manic defence (Lemma, 2003) may
compensate for the repeated failures in meeting unachievable goals and protect
against internal conflict by dissociation or actively keeping apart contradictory
experiences of the self.
Challenging depressive core beliefs and dysfunctional assumptions is regarded as a
useful intervention in promoting adjustment to and recovery from psychosis (e.g.
Jackson & Iqbal, 2000). This lends support to the explanatory power of models
which posit that premorbid, possibly dysfunctional, thinking patterns have a key role
in people's adjustment to psychosis. The notion of psychosis as a key unlocking
latent beliefs about self rooted in earlier adversity seems plausible given the high
incidence of previous trauma amongst people with psychosis, as discussed in the
following section. Fowler and colleagues' (1995) proposed dysfunctional
assumptions account for both the isolation, alienation and powerlessness that people
with psychosis often experience (May, 2004) and also the associated emotional
distress. It is thus hypothesised that dysfunctional assumptions, and the core beliefs
which underlie them, have an impact on adaptation, adjustment and recovery in
psychosis.
Although acknowledged as being a common presenting problem in psychosis,
anxious underlying beliefs in psychosis have seen comparatively little research.
Wells and Matthews' (1994) Self Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model
indicates that a range of metacognitive beliefs - essentially beliefs about thinking,
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including: ruminative processing, activation of dysfunctional beliefs and self-
regulation strategies that perpetuate maladaptive self-knowledge (Morrison & Wells,
2003) - are involved in individuals' vulnerability to and maintenance of
psychological dysfunction. Negative metacognitive beliefs, such as "Not being able
to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness", "My worrying could make me go
mad" and "It is bad to think certain thoughts" (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997),
have been implicated as predisposing factors in auditory hallucinations (Morrison,
Wells & Nothard, 2000).
The role of metacognitions in psychosis has tended to be explored from within an
information processing paradigm, investigating the role of cognitive bias in auditory
hallucinations (e.g. Baker & Morrison, 1998). However, Morrison and Wells (2003)
demonstrated that metacognitive beliefs are more generally associated with
psychological dysfunction. Their findings indicate that people with psychosis who
experience delusional beliefs, but not auditory hallucinations, have more negative
metacognitive beliefs than the general population. The examples of metacognitions
above have much in common with Fowler and colleagues' (1995) dysfunctional
assumption of inner defectiveness. This suggests that worried or anxious core beliefs
may have a role to play in individuals' adjustment to psychosis. The present research
aims to investigate the role of such beliefs alongside depressive core beliefs in the
appraisals of and recovery from psychosis.
1.6- The relationships of trauma and psychosis
Birchwood (2003) cites evidence that a history of trauma, including sexual abuse and
attachment difficulties, may account for the emotional difficulties found in first
episode psychosis, and may also increase an individual's susceptibility to PPD and
other emotional disorders. Recent reviews of the literature on trauma and psychosis
(e.g. Morrison et al., 2003) indicate that the topic merits further discussion, as
detailed below.
1.6.1 - Can trauma cause psychosis?
Investigating the developmental and life histories of people with psychosis indicates
that many have endured specific or cumulative experiences of trauma, such as sexual
or physical abuse, before the onset of psychosis (Honing, 1988; Stampfer, 1990).
That there is often much in common between the nature of earlier trauma (for
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example, being abused by a male family friend who always wore beige pullovers)
and the form and content of psychotic symptomatology (delusional paranoia or
hallucinatory experiences about all men who wear beige pullovers) suggests there
may be a causal relationship between the two. Alternatively, Morrison and
colleagues (2003) posit, because symptoms of psychosis are always connected to
developmental histories, it would be expected that if this history included traumata
they would be incorporated into a person's symptomatology.
Many of the studies in this area are flawed methodologically, with an over-reliance
on case notes or self report data, or non-randomised sampling - however, given the
nature and topic of enquiry, such methodological difficulties indicate that, rather than
dismissing the findings, caution is required in interpreting them. The extent to which
earlier trauma can cause psychosis remains an open question and worthy of further
research - notwithstanding methodological problems, it would seem that for some
people traumatic life experiences are likely to play a role in the development of
psychosis (Morrison et al., 2003), which is congruent with the stress vulnerability
models ofNeuchterlein and Dawson (e.g. 1984).
1.6.2 - Is psychosis a trauma which leads to PTSD?
The lifetime prevalence of PTSD in people with psychosis has been found to be
significantly higher than that of the general population. Of their sample of 275
patients with severe mental illness - predominantly schizophrenia, schizo-affective
disorder or bipolar disorder but also including major depression and personality
disorders - Mueser and colleagues (1998) found that 43% of the cohort met
diagnostic criteria for PTSD compared to the 8 or 9% of the general population.
Switching the direction of causation offers the hypothesis that the experience of
psychosis and its immediate sequelae, such as compulsory hospital admission or
police intervention, leads to PTSD.
Frame and Morrison (2001) found that the greatest amount of PTSD variance was
accounted for by psychotic experiences themselves (52%) with only a small amount
(6%) being accounted for by experiences in hospital. These researchers found that
compulsory admission under the Mental Health Act was unrelated to PTSD. This is
at odds with McGorry and colleagues (1991) suggestion that hospital experiences as
a result of psychosis may contribute directly to PTSD. As with most trauma
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research, Morrison and colleagues (2003) cite methodological flaws - small sample
size, different types of trauma - in the psychosis-causes-PTSD literature. Thus,
definitive answers as to the conceptual mechanisms remain elusive - however, it
would seem reasonable to conclude that, as a response to psychosis, or its treatment,
some people will develop PTSD.
1.6.3 - Psychosis and trauma: the third way?
Morrison and colleagues (2003) pose the question of whether psychosis and PTSD
might be related types of reactions, possibly that they are both parts of a spectrum of
responses to trauma.
Symptomatologically, there are similarities between the two. The hallucinations and
delusions of psychosis have much in common with the intrusive thoughts, images,
and flashback experiences characteristic of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
Furthermore, the negative symptoms of psychosis overlap with those of PTSD,
including: blunted affect, emotional numbing, feelings of derealisation, and
detachment (McGorry et al., 1991).
Morrison and colleagues (2003) suggest that whether a person receives a diagnosis of
PTSD or psychosis may depend on whether meaningful idiosyncratic links can be
made between life history and presenting difficulties, and also whether a person
holds positive beliefs about psychotic experiences (for example, hearing voices may
be comforting). Returning to the example above, if a person's reports of paranoid
thoughts about being threatened by beige pullover wearing men are not connected to
past abuse experiences then it is likely that these would be regarded as characteristic
symptoms of psychosis. If these experiences are regarded as intrusive thoughts and
are linked to past traumatic events featuring men of said description, then the
diagnosis might be that of PTSD.
If this "third way" does account for some people's experience then it is likely that
there would be a more complex interaction of the various cognitive, developmental
and possibly biological mediating factors involved, the detail of which requires
further research. Alternatively, Morrison and colleagues (2003) state, the
development of psychosis post-trauma could be more idiosyncratic. "Culturally
unacceptable appraisals for intrusions" (p. 346) - in diagnostic terms, delusional
beliefs, probably related to traumatic life events - and an individual's responses to
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these appraisals could persist and develop over time: to revisit the above example for
a final time, paranoia and suspiciousness of others may develop as a result of earlier
experiences of betrayed trust; verbal intrusions of men wearing a certain colour of
pullover, in combination with dissociation and de-realisation, may come to be
experienced as voices.
In summary, it is likely, as Morrison and colleagues (2003) themselves conclude, that
all of the above relationships between trauma and psychosis are possible. For some
people, the experience of trauma may lead to psychosis; for others, psychosis, and its
treatment, may be a trauma resulting in PTSD. Both psychosis and PTSD may be
responses to trauma, the development of which may be mediated by the
interpretations of intrusions, which are themselves influenced by earlier experiences
and associated core beliefs.
Investigating each of these pathways in detail is beyond the scope of the present
study. However, the incidence of traumatic symptomatology, as a consequence of
psychosis or other traumata, is a focus of the present research. As is discussed below
in section 1.8.3, it is possible that, given their developmental stage, younger people
have fewer mental models to make sense of the world than adults. This might
especially impact on their ability to make sense of and process traumatic experiences,
thus it is predicted that there will be a higher incidence of traumatic symptomatology
in adolescent onset psychosis than adult onset psychosis.
1.7 - Differences between adolescent and adult-onset
psychosis
A central question of this thesis is concerned with whether psychosis which develops
in adolescence is different from that which develops at other points in people's lives.
Castle and colleagues (1994) proposed that age at initial onset of symptoms could be
used to distinguish between different subgroups within schizophrenia. Reviewing
the literature, Basso and colleagues (1997) state that, compared to onset in early
adulthood, individuals with adolescent onset schizophrenia have a poorer premorbid
status, a bleaker prognosis and greater severity of negative symptoms. Their own
study found that those with adolescent onset schizophrenia, defined as occurring
before 21 years of age, had greater cognitive deficits, particularly with regard to
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memory and executive functioning difficulties, than adult onset schizophrenia,
operationalised as post 25 years of age.
From a neurodevelopmental disease perspective, they attributed these cognitive
differences to cerebral structural abnormalities and cytoarchitectural anomalies that
were the product of a disease process that began early in life. Given that it is equally
possible that these physical CNS changes were the result of psychological changes,
as has been proposed by other researchers, this biologically determined attribution
may be somewhat erroneous. Biology aside, their conclusion is useful in that it
supports the notion that adolescent and adult onset schizophrenia are different
(aetiologically) but that they present as similar syndromes on the spectrum of
schizophrenias and psychoses.
Conversely, Menezes and Milovan (2000) found an apparent continuity between
adolescent and adult onset psychosis. Their review of biopsychosocial variables
thought to be predictive of diagnosis and outcome in first episode psychosis
indicated that there is "no definitive predictor of risk factors that predispose patients
to an earlier-onset psychosis [defined as before 19 years of age]" (p.715), and that
Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores were the best predictor for
diagnosis and outcome in both groups.
Thus, there is mixed evidence as to the role of age of onset in understanding some
people's psychosis. However, there were a number of variables which were not
included in Menezes and Milovan's review, including the neurodevelopmental and
cognitive factors which have been implicated, mentioned above. There is also an
absence of psychodevelopmental factors and the role they may play in the earlier or
later onset of psychosis, and this will now be discussed.
1.7.1 - Psychosis as a disorder of adolescent development
That psychosis predominantly develops during adolescence, a period of development
which is beset with major, at times difficult, psychological maturational changes, has
led some researchers to suggest that psychosis may be a disorder of adolescent
development (Harrop & Trower, 2001; 2003).
There are a number of similarities between normative adolescent development and
the most commonly described prodromal features in first-episode psychosis. Yung
and Jackson (1999) describe nine such features, including: reduced concentration and
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motivation, depressed mood, sleep disturbance, anxiety, social withdrawal,
irritability, suspiciousness and deterioration in role functioning. Intuitively, a
number of these features appear to describe the commonly regarded "storm and
stress" of adolescence. Furthermore, McGorry and colleagues (1995) found that
prodromal characteristics were in fact incredibly common amongst a large
population sample of 657 Australian 16 year olds. With regard to those experiences
which bear similarities with positive psychotic symptomatology, just over half
reported magical ideation, and slightly less reported unusual perceptual experiences.
Yung and Jackson's (1999) prodromal features were also represented, with high
levels of lack of initiative (40%), social withdrawal (18%) and blunt, flat or
inappropriate affect (22%: McGorry et ah, 1995).
However, this does not necessarily indicate that large numbers of young people are
either prodromal or are likely to develop psychosis. Rather, the literature would
suggest that psychosis and adolescent development have much in common. These
common characteristics may indicate that such "prodromal features" are in fact part
of a continuum of normal development. However, when young people are unable to
move on from these stages of adolescent development, when development is
disrupted and developmental trajectories are consequently compromised, individuals
may find themselves further along the continuum from normality and vulnerable to
developing psychosis.
1.7.2 - Similarities between adolescent and psychotic phenomena
Harrop and Trower (2001, 2003) have illustrated a number of adolescent issues
which are very similar to those experienced in psychosis and its prodrome, and a
summary of this and their proposal that early psychosis may result from blocked
adolescent development follows.
As mentioned above, conventional wisdom normally portrays adolescence as a
stressful time. The literature would suggest that the experience of large amounts of
stress is not, in fact, the adolescent norm, but rather, that for a number of
adolescents, this developmental period can be particularly fraught. That said,
adolescence has been described as generating more stress than either childhood or
adulthood (Resnick et ah, 1997), and Arnett (1999) identifies an increase in mood
disruptions, risk behaviours and conflict with parents as the main features of
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adolescent turmoil. The role of stress in psychosis and schizophrenia is regarded as a
major factor in many mainstream theories, namely Neuchterlein and Dawson's
(1984) vulnerability-stress model. Furthermore, stressful life events and trauma in
the 3 weeks preceding psychosis, have been found to be experienced by 70% of
people (Brown & Birley, 1968).
Conflict and renegotiation, often regarding the changing roles of parents and young
people, are common, as adolescents move from subordinate to self ordinate beings,
and parents relinquish control and protection of their offspring. As Harrop and
Trower describe, there is great variability within the research literature as to the
degree and role of familial conflict in psychosis, ranging from very problematic
relationships to those where there are no family disputes. Citing their own
unpublished data, Harrop and Trower found that young people with psychosis were
often highly anxious about familial conflict, yet, in line with normative adolescent
development, desired greater autonomy and power in relationships with relatives.
Given the decreased independence that a diagnosis of mental illness inevitably
brings, this makes arguing with the person, on whom one depends, more problematic
for many young people with psychosis.
In tandem with conflict and renegotiating, and as a result of an increased ability to
de-centre and mentalise-for-others, is young people's de-idealisation of parents and
their consequent increase in personal autonomy. Harrop and Trower describe how
the more experiences adolescents have of their parents, the more likely they are to
become aware of any weaknesses and flaws. That a parent's previously
unquestioned and unquestionable power is now open to debate allows for the
adolescent's increased autonomy.
In line with their findings regarding low levels of conflict, Harrop and Trower found
that young people with psychosis tended to idealise parental figures and remain fairly
non-autonomous. These authors also cite that some young people with psychosis
had, in line with their peers, developed less idealistic views of their parents and had
increased their autonomy. However, they had failed to de-idealise their peers and
were thus left in limbo, caught between the child-parent relationships of their
younger years, which they had left behind and no longer desired, and the sought after
but unobtained equality of peer relationships.
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Necessarily tied up with these processes of adolescence is depression and loss. The
greater personal freedom that de-idealisation and individuation affords young people
is coupled with losses of security and attachment. As discussed in detail above, a
number of theories posit that depression and psychosis are closely associated. Loss
is a major issue for people with psychosis, and may include no longer continuing to
live independently nor working and supporting oneself financially. It may involve a
loss of social standing and peer or intimate relationships. For young people with
psychosis, losses are frequently of imagined future and educational or occupational
aspirations. Furthermore, Harrop and Trower suggest that depression may result
from unmet needs for autonomy and the associated need to individuate from parents
and form significant and supportive peer relationships.
Younger adolescents' egocentricity and grandiosity stems from difficulties in being
unable to differentiate their own perspective from that of others' - self-referential
thinking and the idea of an imaginary audience, being the centre of their and
therefore everyone else's world, therefore automatically follows. Elkind (1967)
proposes that this egocentric view of self and the world is tied to a young person's
stage of cognitive development, and draws on Piagetian concepts of concrete and
formal operations, and the developing abilities of adolescents to independently
represent thoughts and abstract ideas. That egocentrism ebbs away by late
adolescence is attributed to young people's learning about other people through
repeated social interactions and experiences. Harrop and Trower propose that the
egocentricity of young people with psychosis does not abate and is in fact augmented
because of difficulties of autonomy and individuation. This then hampers the
development of more sophisticated relationships with, and consequently
understanding of, other people.
Thus, in summary, it would seem that many of the factors that are present in
experiences of psychosis are also present in normative adolescent development. Erik
Erikson's (1968) classic view of development places the central task of adolescence
as being the creation of identity. As described above, in order to do this, adolescents
are necessarily faced with the challenges of: secondary individuation, as they
refashion their relationships with their parents; developing peer and romantic
relationships; and of finishing education and choosing a career. If these tasks, and
their psycho-developmental correlates as described by Harrop and Trower, are not or
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are only partially completed, then adolescent development will be blocked. That
difficulties arise from the lack of resolution of adolescent tasks, lends support to the
theory that "late-adolescent-onset psychosis is a disorder of adolescent psychological
development" (Harrop & Trower, 2001, p. 253)
Prior to Harrop and Trower's proposals, Schwartz (1990) proposed a model of
psychodynamic precipitants of adolescent onset psychosis. Kutcher and colleagues
(1992) empirically tested out the four factors of this model that were implicated in
the aetiology of psychosis - success and its opportunities; intimacy and its attempts;
the intent to act autonomously; and, participation in psychodynamic psychotherapy.
Their operationalisation of these factors is less than ideal, which they acknowledge
"may not have fully captured the inner world of the conflicted adolescent" (p. 700).
"Intimacy" equals romantic or sexual relationships, "autonomy" is defined as leaving
home, getting a job or starting college, and "success" involves doing "extremely
well" at school or athletically, or "excelling" at art or music.
These factors could be alternatively defined in terms of the changing nature of peer
relationships in adolescence, such as utilising or providing peer support, or the
renegotiation of roles within the family, for example cleaning one's room may move
to be under adolescent jurisdiction rather than that of parents. Nevertheless, with
their definitions, Kutcher and colleagues findings do not support Schwartz's theory
as none of these factors was any more evident in the development of psychosis than
in the development of depression. With the absence of a non-clinical control group it
is difficult to know what to make of this comparison, especially given the high
incidence of depression in psychosis, as discussed above. Furthermore, they argue
that "there is no convincing evidence ...that normative developmental tasks lead to
psychotic breakdown in adolescents" (Kutcher et al., 1992, p. 701) and, on the
contrary, that young people with psychosis complete less of these tasks than their
depressed peers.
This last conclusion is much more congruent with the notion that, rather than the
completion of tasks of adolescence, it is the difficulty in completing or only partially
completing these adolescent developmental tasks, perhaps in the context of stressful
life events or earlier socioemotional developmental experiences, that is key to early-
onset psychosis. Despite Kutcher's rejections, Schwartz's model seems to make
intuitive clinical sense, and, as argued above, the previous operationalisation of it
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may have overlooked some of the subtleties of adolescent developmental tasks.
Harrop and Trower's proposals are also intriguing, but require further research.
Aspects of their theory seem congruent with the previously described functional
models of psychosis, accounting for the role of stress and possibly trauma, and also
that of emotional dysfunction in the form of depression and loss. To further
investigate this, a clinical case study investigating blocked adolescent development
and psychosis is presented in chapter 4 and discussed in relation to the research
hypotheses put forward in section 1.10.
1.7.3 - Predicted differences between adult and adolescent
psychosis
Blocked or disrupted adolescent development in general is likely to impact on young
people's developing emotional understanding of themselves and others. As
described above this is a crucially important developmental period, when more
sophisticated views of self and the world are forming. As it is proposed that core
beliefs are major determinants of people's adjustment to and beliefs about psychosis,
it may be that there are differences between adolescent and adult-onset psychosis
with regard to these factors, as a consequence of forming versus crystallised core
beliefs. The following sections will review the literature on adjustment to and beliefs
about psychosis, and predictions as to the differences between adult and adolescent
psychosis will be made.
1.8- Adaptation, adjustment and recovery in psychosis
It has been proposed that psychological adjustment and adaptation are important
factors in psychosis, including early-onset psychosis (Jackson & Iqbal, 2000), with
possible powerful effects on outcome (e.g. McGlashan, 1987; Bebbington, 1995). It
has been suggested that adaptation to psychosis is mediated by two sets of factors
(Henry, 2004). Firstly, external factors, including age of onset of psychosis, family
psychiatric history and level of social support. Secondly, there may be a number of
internal factors: premorbid level of functioning and coping strategies, including
problem-solving abilities, attribution style, self concept, and core beliefs. The roles
of age of onset and core beliefs and their relationships to adaptation and recovery
will be discussed below.
30
Jackson and Iqbal (2000) cite Rachman's (1980) theory of emotional processing and
his proposal that the process of adaptation to and recovery from major life events,
such as psychosis, consists of a number of stages: an initial awareness of emotional
difficulties, an improvement in emotional functioning, and finally a return to
premorbid routine behaviour. Change is thought to be a result of "emotional dosing"
- in effect, an exposure programme using the competing responses of denial and
intrusion to allow processing of disturbing thoughts. This working through of
difficult experiences may be preceded by a period of denial, or sealing over (see
below), before moving on to further stages of processing and adaptation.
Rather than focussing on individuals' experiences of trauma and their subsequent
adaptation, Janoff-Bullman (1992) proposes that a person's beliefs about self and the
world prior to psychosis are crucial to their recovery. He posits that the experience
of psychosis shatters assumptions of the self as invulnerable and worthy, and the
world as a comprehensible place, and that depression and anxiety are necessary
consequences of this trauma and subsequent re-evaluation of self and world.
However, as the literature reviewed shows, people who experience psychosis have
often experienced adversity and trauma earlier in life. While Janoff-Bullman's
proposal that pre-trauma beliefs may be important determinants of adaptation to
psychosis is in line with a developmental understanding of psychosis, it may be that,
as Power and Dalgliesh (1997) suggest, they confirm rather than shatter peoples'
beliefs about themselves and the world. Earlier adversity may have led to the genesis
of beliefs regarding personal vulnerability or defectiveness that are then confirmed
by the experience of psychosis. However, it is unclear the extent to which this would
hold for young people, whose core beliefs of self and others are at a formative stage.
1.8.1 - Personal beliefs about psychosis
In determining those factors which are important in individuals' adjustment to
psychosis, Birchwood and colleagues (1993, 1998, 2000) have investigated a number
of beliefs people hold. The Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire (Birchwood
et al., 1993) investigates beliefs of: entrapment; humiliation as a result of stigma and
need for social containment; loss of autonomy and social role; and attribution of
causality.
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Beliefs of entrapment are defined as a perceived lack of control of illness, or "the
perception of containment in a punishing cycle of events which result in the disbelief
to reaffirm an identity or sense of belonging" (Jackson & Iqbal, 2000, p. 83).
Appraisals of humiliation include where individuals' social rank, attractiveness or
status is devalued in relation to self or others, and also where individuals are socially
marginalized through the need for containment or detention in hospital.
Appraisals of loss of autonomy and social role indicate the extent to which, as a
result of the experience of psychosis, individuals feel their capacity for independence
has been compromised. Attribution of causality is defined as people's beliefs about
the origins of psychosis lying in their personality, as opposed to psychosis being
regarded as an externalised illness.
Birchwood and colleagues' (1993) initial study indicated that depressed people with
psychosis perceived they had less control of their psychosis, and therefore felt
entrapped by it, than their non-depressed psychotic peers. Thus, they proposed that it
is the appraisal of the experience of psychosis rather than psychosis in and of itself
that is independently linked to depression. A later study found that entrapment and
loss of autonomy and social role were independently linked to depression (Rooke &
Birchwood, 1998), although it was noted that effects of loss may be mitigated by
denial. Furthermore, appraisals of entrapment, loss of social role and autonomy, and
attribution of causality were found to remain stable over a 30 month follow up
period. However, appraisals of stigma or need for social containment at follow up
were not found to be correlated with those at baseline, indicating that such beliefs
become less negative over time.
It is presently unknown whether beliefs about psychosis are associated with time of
onset of psychosis. Those who have completed the tasks of adolescence (completed
their education and begun careers, had relationships with significant others) but then
regressed post psychosis may regard themselves as having suffered greater losses and
thus feeling more entrapped than younger people, whose loss has been of an
anticipated future rather than an actual one. That young people's ideas of their future
are apt to change throughout adolescence (Erikson, 1968) may mean that they are
less attached to them and have less invested in them, relative to adults, whose sense
of selfmay have been based on those qualities which are regarded as lost through the
experience of psychosis. It is thus predicted that adult onset psychosis will be
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associated with greater beliefs of entrapment and loss than adolescent onset
psychosis.
1.8.2 - Recovery Style: Sealing Over versus Integration
McGlashan and colleagues (1976, 1987) have argued that people recovering from
psychosis will adopt one of two recovery or coping styles: sealing over or
integration.
People who seal over during recovery do so in order to isolate their psychotic
experiences, which are regarded as alienating and incompatible with their life goals.
Those who seal over are not interested in an exploration of their symptoms and such
individuals maintain an awareness of the negative aspects of psychosis, consequently
seeking to encapsulate their experience of it.
Those who seek to integrate their experience of psychosis have an awareness of the
continuity of their mental activity and personality before, during and after psychotic
experiences. Integrators are interested in their experiences and elicit the help of
others to make sense of them. They also have an awareness of both the positive and
negative aspects involved in the experience of psychosis.
McGlashan's original investigations, which employed interviews to assess recovery
style, indicated the construct was bimodally distributed. Individuals opted for one or
other recovery style, rather than presenting as a mixed picture. Recovery style was
also regarded as a personality trait that was stable over time. Drayton and colleagues
(1998) proposed that the findings from the Recovery Style Questionnaire, a self
report measure based on the original structured interview, provided supportive
evidence of this bimodal distribution. Contrary to this, Thompson and colleagues
(2003) argue that these two recovery styles are opposite ends of a recovery
continuum and that many individuals thus present as a mixture of the two styles.
Their research into first episode psychosis and recovery style indicated that there was
much greater parity of incidence of recovery styles at the initial recovery stage
(integration: 31.6%; mixed style: 34.7%; sealing over: 33.7%) and between
integration and mixed style but not sealing over at 12 months follow up (integration:
40.7%; mixed style: 38.6%; sealing over: 20.7%). This raises two key questions
regarding: 1) the possibility that recovery style may not be bimodally distributed,
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which the present study seeks to investigate further; and 2) McGlashan's proposition
that recovery style is stable over time.
Tait and colleagues (2003) found that recovery style was prone to naturalistic
changes (that is, not due to psychological intervention) over periods of three and six
months, and they posited that, with appropriate early support, sealing over might be
amenable to change. Studying a cohort of first episode psychosis clients, aged
between 16 and 30, Thompson and colleagues (2003) proposed that psychoeducation
and other psychotherapeutic techniques that challenged patients views and
encouraged a more integrative style led to a more favourable outcome. This is
congruent with Rachman's (1980) notion of emotional processing, that over time
individuals are able to manage difficult experiences more adaptively. Integrators at
the recovery/stabilization phase had better functioning and outcome, that is,
significantly higher scores on the Quality of Life Scale (Heinrichs et al., 1984) and
lower scores on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) and the
Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS: Andreason, 1983), at 12
months post recovery than those who sealed over.
This is in line with H. Jackson and colleagues (1998, 2001) evaluation of cognitively
oriented psychotherapy for first episode psychosis (COPE). Compared to the
treatment-as-usual group (who refused COPE), this intervention led to a change in
attitude towards psychosis, namely moving from a sealing over style to an integrating
recovery style, at both end of treatment and 12 months follow-up. An interesting
finding of Jackson and colleagues' research is that current emotional functioning
(termed as secondary morbidity and measured by the Beck Depression Inventory:
BDI) was significantly better in the treatment-as-usual group. This is in contrast to
Drayton and colleagues' research (1998) with a repeated episode group, where all
moderately or severely depressed people opted for a sealing over style, and all the
integrators were at most only mildly depressed.
Birchwood and colleagues (1993) report that, although easily confused, depression
and negative symptoms have been found to be independent of one another (e.g.
Hirsch et al., 1989). However, there is a clear overlap between the two constructs
(Siris, 1995), and previous research indicates that there is significant correlation
between depressive and negative symptoms (Midler, 2002).
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Thus, it appears a confusing picture, with those who integrated early on in recovery
reporting greater emotional dysfunction at 12 months follow up (as measured by the
BDI: H. Jackson et al., 2001 ) and others reporting less negative symptomatology (as
measured by the SANS: Thompson, 2003) compared to those who sealed over their
experience of their first episode of psychosis.
There may be short term advantages to sealing over, as such a strategy may protect
against experiencing adverse emotional states and maintain a degree of psychological
balance in the initial phase of recovery. However, long term use of this style, with its
concomitant denial and avoidance strategies, may inhibit the recovery process.
Drayton and colleagues (1998) describe sealing over as an adaptive but ineffective
coping strategy for those unable to defend themselves against the trauma of
psychosis, and the general consensus of the literature is that sealing over later
episodes is associated with greater levels of depression and poorer outcome than
integrating the experience of psychosis.
As discussed further below, premorbid beliefs may have determining roles in
recovery. Adapting previously held core beliefs, which are generated through earlier
life experience, to newer more adaptive models is regarded as key to successful
adjustment (C. Jackson & Iqbal, 2000) - however, this would seem incompatible
with a sealing over recovery style, which looks to encapsulate rather than explain the
psychotic episode.
1.8.3 - Factors predicting beliefs about psychosis and recovery
style
Exploring what factors influenced individuals' beliefs about psychosis, Quilliams
and Addington (2003) found that neither having good knowledge about the facts of
psychosis nor better insight - that is, individuals' attribution of symptoms, their
awareness of their difficulties and acknowledged need for treatment - was related to
individuals' beliefs about psychosis. They conclude that in order to improve
outcome, individuals' beliefs, which tend to reflect negative beliefs about
themselves, need to be understood. Quilliams and Addington (2003) posit that these
beliefs may lead to emotional dysfunction and thus, where necessary, would be
appropriately addressed through cognitive behavioural interventions.
35
That CBT may be a useful intervention in adapting beliefs and reducing emotional
distress in psychosis is increasingly being researched, and available evidence
supports its utility (e.g. H. Jackson et al, 2001; French & Morrison, 2003). However,
that it is a person's beliefs about psychosis that lead to emotional dysfunction is
harder to ascertain. It could equally be argued that depression and anxiety, as central
components of the psychosis diatheses, lead to negative beliefs about psychosis.
Succinctly encapsulating one of the problems of research in this area, Rooke and
Birchwood (1998) state: "...psychosis is a long-term difficulty, not a discrete event,
and causal relationships are [therefore] difficult to disentangle". Thus it remains an
important question: do depression or anxiety precede or follow individuals'
adjustment to psychosis, and, moreover, is this relationship causal?
The present research proposes that individuals' core beliefs influence their
adjustment to psychosis. Specifically, it is proposed that individuals depressive and
anxious core beliefs are predictive of negative beliefs about psychosis. It is further
proposed that individuals' core beliefs are also predictive of recovery style,
specifically that depressive and anxious core beliefs predict sealing over. As to the
role of emotional dysfunction, and also traumatic symptomatology, whether integral
or reactive in nature, it is proposed that they too are predictive of individuals' beliefs
about psychosis and recovery style. This relationship is predicted to be the case for
both types of onset, although as discussed below, there might be differences between
adult and adolescent onset psychosis.
Henry (2004) cites Horowitz's (1986) notion of 'person schemas': a number of
"enduring but slowly changing views of oneself and of others" (p.72) which are used
to make sense of the self and the world. However, the frequently traumatic
experience of psychosis may not be congruent with the existing schemata or beliefs
that individuals use to make sense of the world. This might particularly be the case
for young people. Although core beliefs have their roots in earlier experiences,
young people are at a developmental stage where they are developing more
sophisticated and complex models of themselves and others. The consequent
difficulty or inability to make meaning of their psychosis may in part account for
some people's potentially maladaptive coping strategy, namely a blanket denial of
their difficulties. Although it should be noted that initial sealing over does not
exclusively occur in early onset psychosis, Horowitz's proposal may account for the
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tendency to seal over initially, which may serve to protect against emotional
dysfunction.
As described above, Birchwood (2003) proposes a number of potential pathways of
emotional disorder in first episode psychosis. He goes on to propose that
developmental disturbances may shape dysfunctional cognitive beliefs that then
impact on adaptation to psychosis and emotional functioning (Birchwood et al.,
2004). The process is not specified, but a developmental model accounting for these
earlier experiences, be it trauma, abuse, rejection, or other "locks" in Parker's (1998)
language, would posit that the foundations would be laid for negative core beliefs
that would then be activated by the trigger of psychosis, a metaphorical "key".
Consequently, such negative core beliefs might lead to dysfunctional assumptions
such as those put forward by Garety and colleagues (1995) - for example: "bad
things happen because there is something inherently wrong with me", "I am
powerless to control what happens to me" - and hamper adjustment to and recovery
from psychosis.
However, given the proposed relatively lesser experience of loss and entrapment
compared to adult onset psychosis and the possible greater flexibility of core beliefs,
young people with psychosis may be more able to adapt to the experience of
psychosis than those with more fixed perspectives whose onset of psychosis is in
adulthood. It is thus proposed that adult onset psychosis is associated with greater
depressive and anxious core beliefs than adolescent onset psychosis. It is further
proposed that young people with psychosis will have a greater tendency to integrate
their experiences than those whose onset of psychosis is in adulthood. Finally, it is
proposed that this predicted difference between adult and adolescent onset psychosis
affects the proposed relationship between core beliefs and beliefs about psychosis
and recovery style.
1.9 - Summary of Introduction
A brief historical review of the psychosis literature outlines some of the criticisms of
the traditional medical model of disease. Drawing on some of the alternative
psychological models and explanations for psychosis, it is proposed that individuals'
beliefs about and adjustment to psychosis be investigated from a developmental
perspective.
37
Previous research has indicated that anxious and depressive beliefs, which have their
roots in individuals' life experiences, play a role in people's recovery from
psychosis. Emotional disorder, itself in part developmentally determined by
previous experience, has been described as a central part of psychosis, with a number
of pathways being put forward to account for its role in the development,
maintenance and adjustment to psychosis.
Furthermore, the literature on trauma indicates that the experience of earlier adverse
life events may feature in and/or have a predisposing and perpetuating role in some
people's psychosis. For others, psychotic episodes may be experienced as trauma
resulting in PTSD. Alternatively, both psychosis and PTSD might be regarded as
different reactions on a continuum of responses to the experience of trauma, the
determinants of which may have their roots in the meaning made of earlier
experiences.
Recent literature proposes that for those whose onset is earlier, psychosis is a
disorder of disrupted adolescent development, and that therefore early onset
psychosis may be similar in presentation to later onset psychosis, but different with
regard to aetiology, and by extension, intervention and recovery.
This introduction sets the scene for investigating psychosis from a developmental
perspective, examining the roles of age of onset, core beliefs, trauma and emotional
functioning in determining beliefs about illness and recovery style.
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1.10 - Hypotheses
The relationships between age of onset, core beliefs about self, others and psychosis
and recovery style, with reference to the mediating and moderating effect of trauma
and current emotional functioning will be investigated by testing the following
hypotheses.
1. Adult onset psychosis is associated with greater beliefs of entrapment and
loss than adolescent onset psychosis.
2. Adolescent onset psychosis is associated with a greater propensity for
integrating than adult onset psychosis.
3. There is a higher incidence of both traumatic symptoms and emotional
dysfunction in adolescent psychosis than adult onset psychosis.
4. Adult onset core beliefs are more depressive and anxious than adolescent
onset core beliefs.
5. Adult versus adolescent onset, depressive and anxious core beliefs, the
experience of trauma and emotional dysfunction are associated with and
predictive of sealing over and negative personal beliefs about psychosis.
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Chapter 2 - Methodology
2.1 - Design
A mixed design was employed to investigate the relationship between core beliefs,
emotional dysfunction, traumatic symptomatology and illness beliefs and recovery
style for both adolescent and adult onset psychosis.
2.1.1 - Calculation of statistical power & expected effect size
Minimums of 26 and 28 participants per group were calculated as being required in
order to achieve sufficient statistical power to demonstrate large effect sizes at the
0.8 level, using independent /-tests and Pearson's r correlational inferential statistics
respectively. For multiple regression analyses with seven predictor variables, a
minimum of 48 participants overall are required in order to achieve sufficient
statistical power to demonstrate large effect sizes at the 0.8 level (Cohen, 1992).
Fewer participants were recruited than anticipated.
2.2 - Participants
In order to investigate differences between adolescent and adult-onset psychosis,
participants were recruited from two sample populations.
2.2.1 - Adolescent-onset psychosis population
26 young people aged 14-23 (mean age: 18.00 years + 2.10) who were current or
recent users of the Early Psychosis Support Service (EPSS) at the Young People's
Unit, Royal Edinburgh Hospital participated in the study. EPSS is a tertiary level
service providing medical, psychological and social treatment for young people up to
three years after the onset of psychosis.
2.2.2 - Adult-onset psychosis population
17 people aged 29-59 (mean age: 40.00 years + 8.31) participated in the study. In
line with Basso and colleagues' (1997) definition of adult-onset, each of the
participants in this group had had at least one episode of psychosis after the age of
25. They were either users of hospital day services for severe and enduring mental
health problems, or had regular contact with community mental health teams via
community psychiatric nurses, mental health workers or psychiatrists.
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2.3 - Measures
As length of questionnaire is known to affect response rate (Oppenheim, 1993), and
inline with the recommendations of the Local Research Ethics Committee, the
following measures were specifically chosen to maximise the response rate and
streamline the process of participation. The questionnaire pack (see Appendix)
began with questions regarding demographics - age, gender, age at first episode of
psychosis, length of time (in months) since last episode, total number of episodes
experienced - and was followed by the questionnaires described below.
2.3.1 - Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire (PBIQ)
The Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire (Birchwood et al., 1993) is a
sixteen item measure of the degree to which individuals feel that the social and
scientific beliefs about mental illness were accepted by them as a statement about
themselves. The PBIQ consists of five scales: entrapment; self as illness; loss of
autonomy and social role; stigma; and social containment. The original authors and
subsequent researchers (e.g. Rooke & Birchwood, 1998) propose that the scale has
sound psychometric properties. However, the original published values for
Cronbach's alpha, a measure of internal consistency of the scale and its subscales,
indicate that only one subscale ("self as illness": a = 0.71) is above 0.70, the
generally accepted level for reliability (Clark-Carter, 1997). This raises doubts about
the reliability of the scale and its subscales to measure what they purport to measure
and this will be investigated in the Results chapter. Notwithstanding these issues, the
PBIQ remains the best available measure of illness appraisals and for this reason is
employed in the present study.
2.3.2 - Recovery Style Questionnaire (RSQ)
The Recovery Style Questionnaire (RSQ: Drayton et al., 1998) is a thirty-nine item
measure, adapted from the original in-depth interview (McGlashan et al., 1976), used
to determine individuals' recovery styles with regard to integration or sealing over,
as described in Section 1.8.2. Scoring of the RSQ allows the classification of six
recovery styles: integration; tending towards integration; mixed picture in which
integration predominates; mixed picture in which sealing over predominates; tending
to sealing over; and sealing over. Drayton and colleagues (1998) demonstrated that
the RSQ had good psychometric properties, reporting a Cronbach's alpha of 0.73 for
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internal consistency, and found evidence supporting the notion that recovery style is
bimodally distributed. However, bearing in mind Thompson and colleagues' (2003)
recent contrary finding of a non bimodal distribution for recovery style and the
potential for individuals' recovery style to change over time, for the purposes of the
present study, recovery style will also be regarded as a continuous variable. In line
with Drayton and colleagues (1988), a sealing over response scores one point and an
integrating response scores two points, thus giving a possible range of scores from 39
to 78.
2.3.3 - Impact of Event Scale (IES)
The Impact of Event Scale (IES: Horowitz et al., 1979) is a fifteen item measure of
avoidance (seven items) and intrusion (eight items) symptoms associated with
posttraumatic subjective distress. The items are rated on a four point scale as to the
frequency of their occurrence over the previous seven days: Not at all = 0, Rarely =
1, Sometimes = 3, Often = 5. The range of possible scores for the avoidance
subscale is 0 to 35, and for the intrusion subscale 0 to 40. The measure has been
used with both adolescent and adult samples (Joseph et ah, 2000; Zilberg et ah,
1982) who have experienced different types of trauma, and has been shown to have
good reliability and validity (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002).
2.3.4 - Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a fourteen
item scale which provides a brief state measure of anxiety and depression. The
HADS is a well validated clinical research scale, measuring anxiety and depression
on two separate subscales each consisting of seven items. Each item is scored from 0
to 3, the total score for each subscale ranging from 0 to 21. A score on either
subscale from 8 to 10 indicates a possible clinical disorder and a score of 11 and
above is the cut-off for probable clinical levels of anxiety or depression. The HADS
has previously been used with individuals who have a diagnosis of schizophrenia
(Wilkinson et ah, 2000; Haddock et ah, 1996), those with this diagnosis who have
experienced trauma (Chubb & Bisson, 1999) and also with adolescents (White et ah,
1999). Investigations with a large population (N=51930) found the HADS to have
good factor structure, intercorrelations, homogeneity and internal consistency
(Mykleton et ah, 2001)
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2.3.5 - Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS-24)
The dysfunctional attitude scale (DAS-24: Power et al., 1994) is a twenty-four item
scale which consists of three subscales of eight items each, relating to Achievement,
Dependency and Self-Control. It was developed from the original one hundred item
DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978), which sought to test Beck's cognitive theory of
depression that depressed people have more extreme beliefs and that this is part of an
enduring cognitive vulnerability to depression. The three subscales of the DAS-24
have been shown to have acceptable levels of internal consistency, and highly
significant intercorrelations. Evidence suggests that the Dependency subscale is
indicative of a depression-specific vulnerability factor (Power et al., 1995).
2.3.6 - Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30)
The short form of the metacognitions questionnaire (MCQ-30: Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004) is a thirty item measure of individual differences in a selection of
metacognitive beliefs, judgements and monitoring tendencies regarded as central to
the metacognitive model of psychological disorders. In line with the full sixty-five
item MCQ (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), the MCQ-30 consists of five factors,
each containing six items: cognitive confidence, positive beliefs about worry,
cognitive self-consciousness, negative beliefs about the uncontrollability of thoughts
and danger, and beliefs about need to control thoughts. The MCQ-30 has been
shown to have good internal consistency, convergent validity and test-retest
reliability. Although at the time of writing, the MCQ-30 has only been used with a
convenience sample consisting of students, and university and health service
employees, the parent measure or component factors of it have been used to
investigate attributional biases and auditory hallucinations (Baker & Morrison,
1998), the cognitive understanding of persecutory delusions (Freeman, Garety &
Kuipers, 2001) and psychological dysfunction (Morrison & Wells, 2003) amongst




2.4.1 - Research ethics
Ethical approval was obtained from NHS Lothian Local Research Ethics Committee
prior to the commencement of the study.
2.4.2 - Participant Consent
Written, informed consent was obtained from individuals before they entered the
study. Participants were advised that their decision not to participate in the study
would not affect their treatment in any way and that they were free to withdraw at
anytime without giving a reason. Potential participants were initially approached by
their key worker or psychiatrist, who discussed the participant information form. If
further information was required in order to inform the decision to participate, the
individual had the opportunity to consult either the author or the independent advisor
named on the information sheet with them. The independent advisor was a clinical
psychologist in the Young People's Unit who was familiar with the study but was not
involved in it.
2.4.3 - Data collection: Adolescent sample
Meetings with the keyworking staff of EPSS indicated that the most effective way to
collect data was for adolescents to complete the questionnaires in the presence of
their keyworkers. This ensured that young people were at ease and felt comfortable
in completing the questionnaires with a familiar and trusted figure. Feedback from
young people via keyworkers also showed that this method had good face validity:
participation was anonymous and confidential therefore it made sense to them that
the author did not have direct contact with young people at the point of participation.
There were two cases where participation was not anonymous: the first was where
the key worker of the participating young person was the author, and a case study of
the second individual is presented in chapter 4. In order that the second individual's
responses could be tied in with the presented case study, his consent was sought so
that the author could, firstly, identify his completed questionnaires and, secondly,
that a formulation of his case could be included in the present research, having been
suitably anonymised to ensure confidentiality.
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Completing the questionnaires took approximately thirty minutes and was generally
done in one sitting. For three young people, further time was needed and completing
the questionnaires was conducted over two or three meetings at the discretion of the
young person's keyworker. In between sessions, the mental health of one of these
three young people deteriorated, and he was unable to complete the remaining
questionnaires having been admitted to hospital and detained under the Mental
Health Act. A further two young people completed the questionnaires by
themselves at home and then returned them to the author. One young person
completed all but the final questionnaire, the Metacognitions Questionnaire, but did
not give a reason for his refusal to complete this measure.
All but one young person who was invited to participate in the study took part. No
reason was given for non-participation. Young people who had been referred to
EPSS, but whose difficulties were deemed too severe to participate in the research by
their keyworkers, were not invited to participate. In practice, this accounted for only
three young people: where current psychotic symptomatology may have impeded
individuals' ability to concentrate on completing the questionnaires, or where there
was a possibility that participation may have exacerbated individuals' difficulties.
2.4.4 - Data collection: Adult-onset sample
Adult-onset participants were sought through a number of avenues: day services for
adults with severe and enduring mental health problems, community mental health
and assertive outreach teams, and psychiatrists' outpatient caseloads. In the first
three cases, the author met with the staff in each setting, explained the purpose of the
research and asked if they were able to identify any potential participants who would
be eligible and willing to take part. On the advice of the keyworker for each
individual, one of the following courses of action was then taken. Identified
individuals were contacted directly by the author who then arranged an appointment
with them to complete the questionnaires. Alternatively, as with the adolescent
sample, keyworkers were present with the participant as they answered the research
questionnaires, or the questionnaires were left with individuals who then completed
them in their own time and then sent them onto the author.
The psychiatry outpatients who participated in the study were invited to take part by
their psychiatrist, who was approached by the author in an effort to increase the size
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of the sample. Using the participant information sheet, the psychiatrist introduced
the idea of the research project at the end of the outpatient appointment. If willing to
take part, the author either met with the individual immediately thereafter, or
arranged an appointment time that was convenient in order to complete the
questionnaires.
As discussed in chapter 4, it was much harder to access this population than
originally anticipated, and potential reasons for this will be explored. Three
participants contacted the author directly to state that they did not want to take part,
and an unknown number declined the invitation from their keyworker. As with the
adolescent sample, some potential participants' difficulties were such that their
keyworkers thought it not appropriate to approach them regarding participating. It is
not known how many non-participants this accounts for.
2.5 - Data processing
All raw data were entered into an SPSS 11 database. Where appropriate, data were
then computed into variables representing the various scales and subscales used in
this study.
With regard to missing data, two of the adolescent-onset participants, as described
above, did not complete all the questionnaires, and they were thus excluded from
descriptive and inferential statistics which involved the measures they had not
completed. 13 participants did not state the nature or the date of their traumatic
experience and were consequently excluded from the descriptive statistics regarding
length of time since trauma.
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2.6- Operationalisation of hypotheses
The present research hypotheses are investigated using the above scales. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 - "Adult onset psychosis is associated with greater beliefs of
entrapment and loss than adolescent onset psychosis" - is operationalised by
comparing the responses of those whose onset of psychosis was before 19 years of
age with those whose onset was after 25 years of age on the "entrapment" and "loss
of autonomy & social role" subscales of the PBIQ scale using independent /-tests.
Hypothesis 2 - "Adolescent onset psychosis is associated with a greater propensity
for integrating than adult onset psychosis" - is operationalised by comparing the
adult and adolescent onset groups, defined as above, on the RSQ total score, using
independent /-tests. The higher the score the greater the propensity for an integrating
recovery style.
Hypothesis 3 - "There is a higher incidence of both traumatic symptoms and
emotional dysfunction in adolescent psychosis than adult onset psychosis" - is
operationalised by comparing the scores of the two groups on the "intrusion" and
"avoidance" subscales of the IES and the "anxiety" and "depression" subscales of the
HADS using independent Mests. Higher scores are indicative of both greater levels
of traumatic symptoms and emotional dysfunction.
Hypothesis 4 - "Adult onset core beliefs are more depressive and anxious than
adolescent onset core beliefs" - is operationalised by comparing the scores of the
two groups on the subscales and total scores of the DAS-24 and MCQ-30 using
independent /-tests. Lower scores on the DAS-24 are indicative of depressive core
beliefs and higher scores on the MCQ-30 are indicative of anxious core beliefs.
Hypothesis 5 - "Depressive and anxious core beliefs, traumatic symptoms and
emotional dysfunction are associated with and predictive of sealing over and
negative personal beliefs about illness" - is operationalised by investigating the
relationships between scores on the subscales and total scores of the DAS-24 and
MCQ-30, the subscales of the IES and HADS, the RSQ total score and scores on the
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subscales of the PBIQ using Pearson's r correlations and multiple regression
analyses.
2.7 - Statistical tests
The aforementioned independent t-tests, Pearson's r correlations and multiple
regression analyses were employed to test the present research hypotheses using the
SPSS for Windows Release 11.0 computer application.
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Chapter 3 - Results
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Firstly, the psychometric
properties of the scales and their component subscales are investigated with regard to
the present samples and compared with those used in previous research. The present
data are then investigated to determine their suitability for parametric analyses.
Secondly, descriptive statistics of the measures are presented and compared with
those of previous studies. Inferential statistics comparing the two groups on each of
the measures are conducted.
Thirdly, where necessary, hypotheses are reformulated, taking into account the
descriptive statistics and psychometric properties of the measures in the present
research. Fourthly, the implications of the inferential statistics for the research
hypotheses are examined. The Results chapter concludes with further inferential
statistics testing the final research hypotheses.
3.1 - Psychometric properties of scales and subscales
In order to assess the reliability of the measures used in the present study,
Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1984), a measure of internal consistency, was
computed for each of the scales and their component subscales. These values are
given for the sample as a whole, the two groups each containing too few participants
to allow calculation of the alpha levels for each one, and are presented in Table 1,
along with the sample size and number of items of which each scale comprised. For
comparison, alpha values for the scales in previous research are also given. As
recommended by Clark-Carter (1997), alpha values above 0.7 are regarded as
indicative of acceptable internal consistency reliability.
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Table 1 - Psychometric properties of scales and subscales - internal consistencies measured with
Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1984).
Cronbach's alpha
No. of Combinedgroups Previous Research
items (N=43)
PBIQ: entrapment 4 0.549 0.64 (N=84)a
PBIQ: self as Illness 4 0.630 0.71
PBIQ: loss of autonomy & 3 0.685 0.58
social role
PBIQ: stigma 3 0.621 0.61
PBIQ: social containment 2 0.643 0.51
PBIQ: composite score 16 0.814 Not quoted
RSQ: total score 39 0.535 0.73 (N=56)b
IES: intrusion 7 0.905 (N=39)8 0.89 (N=76)c
IES: avoidance 8 0.830 (N=39)8 0.85
IES: total score 15 0.916 (N=39)8 Not quoted
HADS: anxiety score 7 0.868 (N=42) 0.83 (N=2098)d
HADS: depression score 7 0.866 (N=42) 0.85
HADS: total score 14 0.908 (N=42) Not quoted
DAS: achievement 8 0.831 (N=42) 0.847 (N=294)e
DAS: dependency 8 0.713 (N=42) 0.737
DAS: self-control 8 0.794 (N=42) 0.681
DAS: total score 24 0.883 (N=42) Not quoted
MCQ: cognitive confidence 6 0.802 (N=42) 0.93 (N=182)f
MCQ: positive beliefs about 6 0.920 (N=41) 0.92
worry
MCQ: cognitive self 6 0.895 (N=41) 0.92
consciousness
MCQ: negative beliefs about 6 0.914 (N=41) 0.91
uncontrollability of thoughts
and danger
MCQ: beliefs about need to 6 0.670 (N=41) 0.72
control thoughts
MCQ: total score 30 0.899 (N=41) 0.93
a Birchwood et al., 1993; b Drayton et al., 1988;
c Brom & Witztum, 1992: Type of event measured - experience of psychiatric illness;
dMykleton et al., 2001; e Power etal., 1994; f Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 2004
8 Those who reported neither trauma nor traumatic symptoms were excluded from this analysis
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As shown in Table 1, the subscales of the PBIQ do not meet the criterion for internal
consistency, nor the lower levels used in Birchwood and colleagues' (1993) research.
Cronbach (1984) proposes that there must be at least four items per scale in order to
calculate an alpha value for internal consistency. As shown above, this is not the
case for three of the five subscales of the PBIQ, which further compromises the
reliability and validity of the subscales as separate constructs. These findings may be
a result of the relatively low present sample size, but given that the factor analytic
properties of the scale have never been shown to be optimal, it may be that the
proposed internal structure of the scale is questionable and does not capture
meaningful factors within the construct of beliefs about illness.
While the Cronbach's alphas reported for the PBIQ subscales refers to the coherency
of the scale's internal structure, the alpha reported for the PBIQ composite score (a =
0.814 for groups combined) is an indicator of the utility and reliability of the measure
of personal beliefs about illness. The alpha value for the composite measure suggests
that it has good internal consistency. This composite measure has not been used in
previous research, however given the present limitations of the subscales, it is this
measure that will be investigated in the following inferential statistical analyses.
This requires the reformulating of some of the research hypotheses to more general
propositions.
As with the PBIQ composite score, the alpha reported for the RSQ total score (a =
0.535 for groups combined) is an indicator of the utility and reliability of the measure
of individuals' recovery style. It is less than that desired for good reliability and that
cited by previous research (a = 0.73: Drayton et al., 1998). The reasoning for
Drayton and colleagues' calculating of Cronbach's alpha, necessarily a parametric
analysis, is unclear. Given their later statement that recovery style is bimodally
distributed, in line with previous research, and that therefore only non-parametric
analyses are appropriate, this appears incongruous. However, given the present
findings displayed in the following descriptive results section (Table 4), this total
score measure, in preference to recovery style category, will be further investigated
with regard to testing the research hypotheses. As recovery style has not been used
in this manner before and internal consistency is less than optimal, results should be
interpreted cautiously.
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In line with previous research (e.g. Brom & Witztum, 1992; Mylkleton et al., 2001),
the two subscales of both the IES and HADS were found to have good reliability
with regard to internal consistency, as shown in Table 1.
The "achievement", "dependency" and "self-control" subscales and the total score of
the DAS-24 were found to have good levels of internal consistency, as shown in
Table 1. The MCQ total score and all but one of the MCQ-30 subscales (MCQ:
"beliefs about need to control thoughts") were found to be internally consistent, thus
inferential statistical analyses were carried out on all but this one subscale due to its
lower reliability. Given that previous research (as shown in Table 3.1) has found
good levels of internal consistency for this latter subscale, it may be that the present
sample was too small to allow meaningful analysis of this subscale, rather than
structural anomalies within the MCQ-30 itself.
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3.1.1 - Requirements for parametric analyses
The raw data were explored in order to determine whether they were normally
distributed, interval level data with homogeneity of variance, and thus met the
requirements for parametric analyses.
In line with previous use of the measures and the proposal above that the RSQ can be
used as a continuous variable consisting of equally spaced points, all measures were
regarded as providing interval level data.
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests of normality were performed to assess the distributions
of the measures, and significant departures from normality are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 - Significant departures from normality of scales and subscales
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test




DAS-24: achievement 0.242 17 p <0.01
DAS-24: dependency 0.243 17 /? < 0.01
DAS-24: total score 0.222 17 p < 0.05
MCQ-30: positive beliefs
about worry
0.319 17 p< 0.001
Adolescent onset
HADS: anxiety 0.185 25 p < 0.05
DAS-24: dependency 0.214 25 p < 0.05
MCQ-30: positive beliefs
about worry
0.193 24 p < 0.05
MCQ-30: cognitive
confidence
0.180 24 p < 0.05
Groups combined
DAS-24: achievement 0.153 42 p < 0.05
DAS-24: dependency 0.202 42 p< 0.001
MCQ-30: positive beliefs
about worry
0.196 41 p< 0.001
MCQ-30: negative beliefs
about worry
0.164 41 < 0.01
However, it has been suggested that the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test is frequently too
sensitive to small deviations from normality (Norusis, 1993). As a valid and reliable
alternative, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) propose that distributions of variables can
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be regarded as normal if skewness and kurtosis, divided by their respective standard
errors, is + 1.96. This method indicated that the DAS-24: "achievement" subscale
and total score and the MCQ-30: "cognitive confidence" and "positive beliefs about
worry" subscales were not normally distributed in the adult onset sample. In the
adolescent onset sample, the MCQ-30: "positive beliefs about worry" subscale was
found to not be normally distributed. With regard to the sample as a whole, the
HADS: "depression" subscale and MCQ-30: "positive beliefs about worry" subscale
were found to not be normally distributed.
For the purposes of inferential analyses, these scales and subscales were transformed.
In line with Clark-Carter's (1997) recommendation, those which were positively
skewed - HADS: "depression", MCQ-30: "cognitive confidence" and MCQ-30:
"positive beliefs about worry" - were transformed using a natural log transformation,
and those negatively skewed - DAS-24: "achievement" subscale - using a squared
(x2) transformation This gives all the measures normal distributions which afford
parametric analyses.
With regard to homogeneity of variance, there was only one significant difference
between the two groups and this was on the DAS-24: "achievement" subscale (F =
6.964, df = 1/39, p < 0.05). However, Brace and colleagues (2003) propose that in
order to carry out parametric analyses, the variance of one group should not be less
than a third of the other. With respective variances of 72.35 and 163.43, the
adolescent onset and adult onset groups are within this boundary. Furthermore,
Clark-Carter (1997) proposes that parametric analyses are robust statistics than can
be conducted when not all parametric requirements are met. In line with this, and
given that the data is interval level and, transformed, is normally distributed, the
DAS-24: "achievement" subscale is regarded as appropriate for parametric analyses.
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3.2 - Descriptive statistics and comparisons between adult
and adolescent onset psychosis
Descriptive statistics of the demographical information for the adolescent-onset
sample are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 - Demographics and details of psychotic episodes
Adolescent onset (N=26) Adult onset (N=17)
Gender (N of male:female) 18:8 10:7
Mean + S.D. Mean ± S.D.
Age in years 18.00 ± 2.10 40.00 ±8.31
Age in years at first episode of psychosis 15.85 ±1.19 31.29 ±6.33
Time in months since last episode 7.85 ± 11.06 10.80 ± 12.34
Total number of episodes of psychosis 1.96+ 1.33 4.50 ±4.00
Number ofmonths between episodes of psychosis 19.37 ± 14.67 31.24 ±20.28
[12 / (number of episodes / ( age - age at 1st onset))]
Descriptive statistics of the measures employed in this study, along with inferential
statistics from the independent f-tests carried out to compare the adult and adolescent
onset groups, are shown in Table 4.
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PBIQ: composite score 36.89 + 7.34 (N=26) 38.12 ±5.77 (N=17) -0.581 41 NS
RSQ total score: 63.23 ±3.88 (N=26) 64.41 ±4.33 (N=17) -0.932 41 NS
Integration: No. ("%>) participants 2 (7.7%) 3 (17.6%) - - -
Tends toward integration 11 (42.3%) 8 (47.1%) - - -
Mixed picture: integration 9 (34.6%) 5 (29.4%) - - -
Mixed picture: sealing over 4 (15.6%) 1 (5.9%) - - -
Tends towards sealing over 0 0 - - -
Sealing over 0 0 - - -
Number (%) of respondents
experiencing traumatic symptoms
24 (92.3%) 15 (88.2%) - -
IES: intrusion subscale 14.87 ± 10.37 (N=24) 15.93 ± 12.00 (N=15) -0.292 37 NS
IES: avoidance subscale 14.33 ±10.12 11.60 ±8.33 0.876 37 NS
IES: total score 29.21 ± 18.23 27.53 ± 19.31 0.273 37 NS
Number ofmonths since trauma 21.33 ±27.78 (14=18) 58.91 ±65.52 (N=12) - - -
HADS: anxiety subscale 8.36 ± 4.60 (N=25) 8.88 ± 5.70 (N=17) -0.328 40 NS
HADS: depression subscale 5.52 ± 3.51 8.29 ±6.14 -1.187 40 NS
HADS: total score 13.88 ±7.41 17.18 ±10.78 -1.177 40 NS
DAS: achievement 34.68 ±9.19 (N=25) 34.98 ± 12.78 (N=17) -0.077 40 NS
DAS: dependency 32.40 ±7.34 33.59 ±11.05 (N=17) -0.420 40 NS
DAS: self-control 29.80 ± 10.17 33.24 ±10.56 -1.058 40 NS
DAS: total score 96.88 ± 19.50 101.76 ±31.16 -0.626 40 NS
MCQ: cognitive confidence 13.52 ±4.46 (N=25) 11.76 ±4.66 (N=l 7) 1.289 40 NS
MCQ: positive beliefs about
worry
10.92 ±4.94 (N=24) 9.06 ±4.63 1.340 39 NS
MCQ: cognitive self consciousness 16.29 ±5.43 15.06 ±6.08 0.682 39 NS
MCQ: negative beliefs about
uncontrollable thoughts & danger
13.13 ±5.56 14.65 ±7.31 -0.758 39 NS
MCQ: total score 67.40 ±16.22 62.71 ± 18.42 0.866 39 NS
56
3.3- Reformulation and reoperationalisation of hypotheses
In light of the findings regarding the lack of internal consistency for some of the
subscales employed in this study, adjustments are required to both the hypotheses
and their operationalisation.
Rather than the specific focus on entrapment and loss, as measured by two of the
subscales of the PBIQ, overall negative beliefs about illness are investigated, using
the composite PBIQ score which was found to have good internal consistency. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 is reformulated as "Adult onset psychosis is associated with greater
negative beliefs about illness than adolescent onsetpsychosis
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 remain as previously stated, although 4 and 5 are
reoperationalised in line with the unreliability of one of the subscales of the measure
of anxious core beliefs. The MCQ-30: "beliefs about need to control thoughts"
subscale is not used due to its low Cronbach's alpha values. Anxious core beliefs are
thus investigated using the four remaining MCQ-30 subscales and total score,
transformed where necessary as detailed above.
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3.4 - Implications of inferential statistics for Hypotheses 1 to 4
As shown in Table 4, independent /-tests were carried out in order to test for
differences between adult and adolescent onset scores on the above measures and
their subscales, in line with the research hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 - "Adult onset psychosis is associated with greater negative beliefs
about illness than adolescent onsetpsychosis
Compared to adolescent onset psychosis, adult onset psychosis was not found to be
associated with greater negative beliefs about illness (/ = -0.581, df = 41, NS). Thus
the null hypothesis, that adult onset psychosis is not associated with greater negative
beliefs about illness than adolescent onset psychosis, cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis 2 - "Adolescent onset psychosis is associated with a greater propensity
for integrating than adult onsetpsychosis
The frequencies and percentages of the incidence of each category of recovery style
for adult and adolescent psychosis are shown in Table 4. Means and standard
deviations for recovery style total score are also displayed for both groups. No
significant differences were found between the adult and adolescent onset groups (t =
-0.932, df = 41, NS), with regard to recovery style total score. Thus, the null
hypothesis, that adolescent psychosis is associated with no greater propensity for
integrating than adult onset psychosis, cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis 3 - '•'•There is a higher incidence of both traumatic symptoms and
emotional dysfunction in adolescentpsychosis than adult onsetpsychosis
Descriptive statistics for the length of time since the traumatic event, and the
avoidance and intrusion subscales of the Impact of Event scale are presented in Table
4. Four participants (Adolescent: N=2; Adult: N=2) reported that they had not
experienced any trauma which was presently problematic for them, thus these
individuals' scores were not included in the means displayed below. The most
frequently cited traumatic event described by both groups was the experience of
psychosis (Adolescent: N=8; Adult: N=7), followed by admission to hospital
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(Adolescent: N=3; Adult: N=4). Two participants in each group cited the loss of a
close friend or family member as the stressful life event. In addition to those who
reported no trauma or traumatic symptoms mentioned above, details of the traumatic
event were not disclosed in a further 7 adolescent onset cases and 3 adult onset cases,
although these individuals did report the presence of traumatic symptoms. Other
traumata experienced by adolescents, each cited once, included: being bullied,
previous suicide attempts, and being angry with parents.
The incidence of traumatic symptoms, as either intrusive (t = -0.292, df = 37, NS) or
avoidant (t = 0.876, df = 37, NS) symptoms, and the level of emotional dysfunction,
in the form of depression (t = -1.861, df = 40, NS) or anxiety (/ = -0.328, df = 40,
NS), were not found to be significantly different between the two groups. Thus the
null hypothesis, that there is not a higher incidence of either traumatic symptoms or
emotional dysfunction in adolescent psychosis than adult onset psychosis, cannot be
rejected.
Hypothesis 4 - '•'■Adult onset core beliefs are more depressive and anxious than
adolescent onset core beliefs"
As shown in Table 4, no significant differences were found between adolescent and
adult onset psychosis with regard to dysfunctional attitudes of achievement,
dependency, self control or overall dysfunctional attitudes. Furthermore, as also
shown in Table 4, no significant differences were found between adult and
adolescent onset psychosis with regard to the subscales or total score of the MCQ-30,
measures of anxious core beliefs. Thus the null hypothesis, that adult onset core
beliefs are no more depressive and anxious than adolescent onset core beliefs, cannot
be rejected.
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3.5- Investigating Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 - "depressive and anxious core beliefs, the experience of trauma and
emotional dysfunction are associated with sealing over and negative personal beliefs
about illness" was tested statistically using multiple regression analyses. In order to
identify potential predictors of recovery style and beliefs about illness, analyses
were conducted to determine whether these criteria variables were correlated with
depressive and anxious core beliefs, traumatic symptoms and emotional dysfunction.
These correlations for the sample as a whole are reported in Table 5 and for adult
onset and adolescent onset in Table 6. Given that the direction of the correlations are
predicted a priori, post hoc analyses, such as Bonferroni corrections, are not required.
Table 5 - Pearson's r correlations of recovery style and personal beliefs about illness with
depressive and anxious core beliefs, traumatic symptoms and emotional dysfunction for both
groups combined
PBIQ composite score RSQ Total score
r N Significance r N Significance
Combined groups
DAS: achievement -0.296 42 p < 0.05 0.052 42 NS
DAS: dependency -0.477 42 p< 0.001 -0.015 42 NS
DAS: self control -0.281 42 p < 0.05 0.079 42 NS
DAS: total score -0.432 42 < 0.01 0.029 42 NS
MCQ: cognitive confidence 0.422 42 p<0.01 0.090 42 NS
MCQ: positive beliefs about worry 0.187 41 NS 0.021 41 NS
MCQ: cognitive self consciousness 0.025 41 NS 0.201 41 NS
MCQ: negative beliefs about
uncontrollable thoughts & danger
0.504 41 p< 0.001 0.085 41 NS
MCQ: total score 0.473 41 p< 0.001 0.135 41 NS
HADS: anxiety subscale 0.633 42 p< 0.001 0.070 42 NS
HADS: depression subscale 0.305 42 p < 0.05 -0.194 42 NS
HADS: total score 0.564 42 p< 0.001 -0.052 42 NS
IES: intrusion subscale 0.485 39 p< 0.001 0.205 39 NS
IES: avoidance subscale 0.342 39 J3<0.01 0.019 39 NS
IES: total score 0.462 39 p<0.01 0.131 39 NS
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Table 6 - Pearson's r correlations of recovery style and personal beliefs about illness with
depressive and anxious core beliefs, traumatic symptoms and emotional dysfunction in











MCQ: positive beliefs about worry
MCQ: cognitive self consciousness
MCQ: negative beliefs about









DAS: achievement -0.560 17 p < 0.01 -0.052 17 NS
DAS: dependency -0.721 17 p< 0.001 -0.033 17 NS
DAS: self control -0.597 17 p<0.01 -0.133 17 NS
DAS: total score -0.700 17 p< 0.001 0.095 17 NS
MCQ: cognitive confidence 0.475 17 p < 0.05 0.193 17 NS
MCQ: positive beliefs about worry 0.136 17 NS -0.088 17 NS
MCQ: cognitive self consciousness 0.241 17 p< 0.001 0.137 17 NS
MCQ: negative beliefs about
uncontrollable thoughts & danger
0.442 17 p< 0.001 0.153 17 NS
MCQ: total score 0.578 17 p< 0.001 0.052 17 NS
HADS: anxiety subscale 0.796 17 p< 0.001 0.038 17 NS
HADS: depression subscale 0.437 17 p < 0.05 -0.287 17 NS
HADS: total score 0.656 17 p< 0.001 -0.144 17 NS
IES: intrusion subscale 0.600 15 < 0.01 0.235 15 NS
IES: avoidance subscale 0.583 15 p < 0.05 0.141 15 NS
IES: total score 0.624 15 /j < 0.01 0.207 15 NS
-0.153 25 NS 0.127 25 NS
-0.346 25 p < 0.05 0.018 25 NS
-0.154 25 NS 0.199 25 NS
-0.285 25 NS 0.140 25 NS
0.459 24 /? < 0.01 0.070 24 NS
0.284 24 NS 0.162 24 NS
-0.082 24 NS 0.288 24 NS
0.559 24 < 0.01 -0.014 24 NS
0.468 24 p< 0.001 0.247 24 NS
0.546 25 p < 0.005 0.086 25 NS
0.373 25 NS -0.154 25 NS
0.516 25 p< 0.001 -0.019 25 NS
0.431 24 p< 0.001 0.175 24 NS
0.284 24 NS 0.017 24 NS
0.403 24 p < 0.05 0.090 24 NS
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As shown in Table 5, for the sample as a whole, beliefs about illness are correlated
with traumatic symptoms, emotional dysfunction and both depressive and anxious
core beliefs, with the exception of two of the MCQ-30 subscales. None of these
variables was found to correlate with recovery style.
A similar set of relationships was found for the adult onset group (Table 6), with all
but one of the MCQ-30 subscales correlating with the PBIQ composite score. Again,
none of these variables was significantly correlated with recovery style.
There was greater variability as to those variables that correlated with the PBIQ
composite score in adolescent onset psychosis (Table 6). While, as with the adult
onset group, correlations were found with anxious core beliefs, no significant
correlations were found with regard to avoidant traumatic symptoms or current levels
of depression. Of the measures of depressive core beliefs, only the DAS:
"dependency" subscale was significantly correlated with beliefs about illness in the
adolescent onset group. As with the adult onset group, none of the variables was
found to correlate with recovery style.
Finding a correlation between variables in one group but not the other does not mean,
however, that there is necessarily a significant difference between the two groups
with regard to the relationship between these variables. In order to investigate these
relationships further, multiple regression analyses are used to determine whether
these correlated variables and type of onset are predictive of personal beliefs about
illness.
Given the absence of significant correlations, the investigated variables are not
predictive of recovery style and therefore no further analysis of the predictors of
recovery style is conducted.
3.5.1 - Regression analyses
Emotional dysfunction, traumatic symptomatology and anxious core beliefs are
operationalised as predictor variables as described in section 2.6. As shown in Table
6, in the adolescent onset sample, the DAS: total score was not significantly
correlated with beliefs about illness. However, the DAS: "dependency" subscale was
correlated with illness beliefs in both groups, and highly correlated when the groups
were combined (see Table 5). Thus the DAS: "dependency" subscale is used in
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preference over the DAS: total score as a measure of depressive core beliefs and as a
predictor variable in the following multiple regression analyses.
Initial multiple regression analysis
The stepwise method, employed in the following analyses, is the procedure of choice
where the primary aim is to determine those factors which are predictive of the
criterion variable, and where multicollinearity is present (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996;
Cohen et al., 2003). It is also, however, recommended for large, representative
samples. As the present sample falls short of that required for statistical power (as
stated in section 2.1.1), the following analyses should be interpreted with caution.
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) recommend that, where sample sizes are small and
because regression is a conservative analysis, the levels for entry and removal of
variables from the regression analysis can be set at 0.1 and 0.15 respectively to
ensure important variables are not excluded, and thus these levels were employed in
the present analyses.
Using the stepwise method, a significant model emerged {F\^q= 25.719, p < 0.0005).
Adjusted R2 = 0.382. As Table 7 shows, the only variable found to be significantly
predictive of personal beliefs about illness was HADS: "anxiety" score (J3 = 0.630, p
< 0.0005), indicating that 38.2% of the variance may be accounted for by current
level of anxiety. Depressive and anxious core beliefs, intrusive or avoidant traumatic
symptomatology, and current levels of depression were not found to be significant
predictors in this model. Furthermore, adult onset versus adolescent onset was not
found to be a predictive factor of personal beliefs about illness. These variables were
not found to contribute significantly to the model and were thus removed during the
course of the stepwise multiple regression.
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Table 7 - Multiple regression analysis with PBIQ composite score as criterion variable
Predictor R R2 Adj. R2 F dfs Sig.
HADS: anxiety 0.630 0.397 0.382 25.719 1,40 p < 0.0005
Predictor variables P In A f-score Significance
HADS: anxiety - 0.630 5.071 p < 0.0005
Adult vs. adolescent onset 0.112 - 0.895 NS
HADS: depression -0.042 - -0.261 NS
IES: intrusion 0.146 - 0.947 NS
IES: avoidance 0.094 - 0.691 NS
MCQ: total score 0.145 - 0.925 NS
DAS: dependency -0.193 - -1.351 NS
Collinearity Diagnostics
The collinearity diagnostics allow for the examination of whether the predictive
variables are themselves too highly intercorrelated, which leads to complexities in
interpreting regression coefficients. The condition index is 3.678 and the tolerance
and variance inflation factors are shown in Table 8. Cohen and colleagues (2003)
argue that the conventional statistical rules of thumb - such as variance inflation
factor (VIF) less than 10, condition index less than 30 and tolerance greater than 0.2
- are too liberal. That the current data are far removed from these levels indicates
that the predictor variables are not too highly correlated to affect the regression
coefficient.
Table 8 - Multicollinearity diagnostics for multiple regression analysis with PBIQ composite
score as criterion variable
Tolerance Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
Adult vs. adolescent onset 0.996 1.04
HADS: anxiety 1.000 1.000
HADS: depression 0.599 1.671
IES: intrusion 0.655 1.526
IES: avoidance 0.846 1.183
MCQ total score 0.635 1.574
DAS: dependency 0.744 1.345
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Further Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to determine whether there was a further model which was hidden by current
levels of anxiety, a further stepwise multiple regression was performed to determine
the effect of the other variables when HADS: anxiety was excluded, the results of
which are shown in Table 9.
Table 9 - Multiple regression analyses with PBIQ composite score as criterion variable
excluding HADS anxiety
Predictors R R2 Adj. R2 F dfs Sig.
DAS: dependency
MCQ: total score
0.539 0.290 0.253 7.765 2,38 p< 0.001
Predictor variables P In p t-score Significance
DAS: dependency
MCQ: total score




-0.300 -1.891 p = 0.066
0.320 2.019 p = 0.051
0.212 - 1.561 NS
0.211 - 1.460 NS
0.173 - 1.209 NS
0.258 - 1.622 NS
Using the stepwise method, a model approaching significance emerged (7*2,38=
7.765, p < 0.001). Adjusted R2 = 0.253. As Table 9 shows, the DAS: "dependency"
subscale and MCQ: total score approached significance at the p < 0.05 level,
suggesting that 25.3% of the variance may be explained by depressive and anxious
core beliefs. It is speculated that in a larger sample with appropriate power, this
association may have reached significance. Intrusive and avoidant traumatic
symptomatology, and current levels of depression were not found to be significant
predictors in this model. Adult onset versus adolescent onset was again not found to
be a predictive factor of personal beliefs about illness. As before, these variables
were not found to contribute significantly to the model and were thus removed
during the course of the stepwise multiple regression.
Collinearity Diagnostics
The condition index is 16.329 and the tolerance and variance inflation factors are
shown in Table 10. Again, that the current data are far removed from those levels
conventionally regarded as problematic indicates that the predictor variables are not
too highly correlated to affect the regression coefficient.
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Table 10- Multicollinearity diagnostics for multiple regression analysis with PBIQ composite
score as criterion variable, excluding HADS anxiety
Tolerance Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
Adult vs. adolescent onset 0.980 1.020
HADS: depression 0.871 1.149
IES: intrusion 0.711 1.407
IES: avoidance 0.898 1.113
MCQ total score 0.742 1.347
DAS: dependency 0.742 1.347
Thus, although there are a number of correlations between variables and current level
of anxiety is predictive of personal beliefs about illness in the present sample, the
null hypothesis that depressive and anxious core beliefs, the experience of trauma
and emotional dysfunction are not predictive of sealing over and negative personal
beliefs about illness cannot be rejected.
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Chapter 4 - Adolescent onset psychosis as a
disorder of adolescent development: A case study
The following case study illustrates Harrop and Trower's (2003) theory of psychosis
as a result of disordered adolescence. Consent was given by the young person for his
case to be described herein, and also for his questionnaire responses to be identified
and included. Changes have been made to ensure confidentiality and anonymity.
4.1 - Donnie: loss, disrupted adolescent development and
psychosis
Donnie is 17 years old and was referred to EPSS ten months ago. His current
presentation includes hearing voices and holding beliefs about voices being able to
predict his thoughts and those of others. He appears low in mood at times, although
Donnie does not always agree that this is the case. He has lost interest in his
appearance and at times appears dishevelled. At times, his social skills seem lower
than might be expected when compared to his peers. Although a participant in the
group interventions run by EPSS, Donnie tends to keep to himself and at times will
isolate himself from others.
Family Constitution
Donnie is the oldest of four children. His younger brother Peter, who had a history
of physical health problems, died aged 10 when Donnie was 11 years old, 6 years
ago. He has a younger brother and sister, and he lives at home with his parents and
his siblings, whom he occasionally baby-sits. Donnie reports that his aunt died
approximately 3 years ago, and this, coupled with his brother's death, seems to have
had a significant impact on the family.
Personal History
Donnie reports that throughout childhood he lived life through his more outgoing
younger brother. He had few friendships during primary school and those he did
have were through Peter. In middle and earlier childhood, Donnie reports that he
easily became upset, and this may have made him vulnerable to the bullying he
endured at primary school.
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Donnie reports that at times his being upset elicited not support or nurturance, but
rather anger from his parents. This remains the case, with Donnie reporting that they
can respond angrily when he is upset by distressing thoughts. Peter is described by
Donnie as much hardier and resilient to the adversities that Donnie found upsetting.
In time, Donnie also adopted a more robust approach, and reports that around the age
of 10 or 11, he hardly ever cried, not long before Peter's death. Donnie reports that
he and his brother were treated no differently by their parents, except when Peter was
ill, when, quite rightly in Donnie's view, he received more attention.
As he progressed through secondary school, Donnie reports that he was less
withdrawn and had more friends and acquaintances. In addition to beginning to feel
less social isolated, he was also achieving academically. Donnie sought a romantic
relationship with a girl in his peer group, someone to whom he felt very close to and
understood by. However, this feeling was not reciprocated, which led to Donnie
feeling both angry and upset at the individual, and then subsequently guilty for
expressing his anger. This event is frequently played over in Donnie's mind and is
central to much of the content of his auditory hallucinations. Furthermore, this event
seems to have marked the end of this positive period of peer relationships, with
Donnie's one experience of trusting others going badly and lead to him becoming
closed off from others once more.
Donnie reports difficulties in being able to experience his emotions. He has
difficulty in understanding and regulating negative emotions, such as anger and low
mood. Donnie is more consciously aware of his feelings of grief and loss, which are
linked to his feelings of guilt for not having grieved as he thinks (and/or he thinks
others think) he should have for his aunt and brother. Donnie reports not having
been upset at the time of his family members' deaths, and believes that his parents
resent him for this perceived lack of emotion and caring.
Formulation
Given Peter's chronic medical condition, it seems that there were necessarily some
differences in the parenting of Donnie and his younger brother. Donnie may have
sought the attention of his parents by following Peter's examples: initially seeking
attention through parental consolation in times of distress, and then, given that
method's failure, opted for Peter's hardier approach.
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This hardier approach involved a degree of emotional numbing that may have
impacted on Donnie's developing abilities to process and express his emotional
states. This is particularly evident around the time of Peter's death. His previous
experience of crying being an annoyance for others, added to his parents possible
unavailability due to their own grief, left Donnie with no-one to help him process and
express his own confused emotions of anger, guilt and sadness around his brother's,
and later aunt's, death.
It is unclear when Donnie first heard voices. This may be due in part to a lack of
peer relationships and bullying in his younger years, which may have led in turn to
his withdrawal into himself and his internal world (Harrop & Trower, 2003). With
Peter's death, Donnie suffered a number of losses. Donnie used Peter to help him
manage in the external social world and when Peter died Donnie lost his main means
of peer social support. Without peers or family to aid his adolescent self-
construction - his developing sense of who he is - Donnie's voices arose from his
social isolation and alienation in order to fulfil these roles. That Donnie felt unable
to show how he felt may have resulted in his developing sense of self being put on to
him by others. His presented self, how he really thought and felt about himself, was
not affirmed by others, which may have led to feelings of alienation. His one
adolescent attempt of using others in his self-construction resulted in the
confirmation of negative beliefs about himself and others. Consequently, isolated
and alienated from his peers in the external world, Donnie's voices and internal
world maladaptively meet the needs of his developing sense of self.
Furthermore, his adolescent development was curtailed by his difficulties in
processing and expressing emotions. Donnie sees the world and himself from his
own point of view and assumes that others will see him from this point of view,
which is more in line with the egocentric perspective of a younger adolescent. The
result is that Donnie views himself negatively and thus believes that others also view
him negatively. Some of his distressing thoughts are attributed to the voices, which
arose from his social isolation. These distressing thoughts are thus not owned by
Donnie, and, experienced as coming from an external source, serve as further
confirmation of his negative self view.
Connected to his egocentricity are Donnie's difficulties in de-idealising others. His
peers/voices are frequently always right in Donnie's view: if they tell him he is a bad
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person then he is a bad person, if they say that other people think he is rubbish then
he thinks others think he is rubbish. Rather than using other people to help him
process and express difficult emotions, Donnie uses his voices. However, the voices,
like his peers, are idealised and regarded as omniscient and powerful. Although at
times benevolent and functioning essentially as a substitute peer group, Donnie's
voices can become malevolent, which is especially problematic as their negative
statements seem unchallengeable, which contributes to his low mood.
4.2- Connecting disordered adolescent development with
the role of core beliefs in psychosis
Harrop and Trower's (2003) theory of disordered adolescent development is thus
useful in accounting for Donnie's experience of psychosis. However, Donnie's
difficulties are also presented in terms of their developmental psychopathology, with
regard to his experience of difficulties earlier in life. The following section seeks to
integrate the role of core beliefs in adjustment to psychosis with the model of
psychosis as a disorder of adolescent development.
As a result of his earlier experiences of how others handle his emotions, Donnie
developed capacities which enabled him not to express his feelings, but that also
prevented him from being able to process his emotions. This is congruent with the
proposal that core beliefs are formed by earlier experiences: Donnie's endorsement
of dysfunctional attitudes such as "7 should always have control over my feelings"
and "what other people think about me is very important" combined with
metacognitive beliefs such as "7 should be in control ofmy thoughts all of the time"
supports this. As shown in Table 11, Donnie scored highly on the measures of
depressive and anxious core beliefs.
His non-expression and processing of emotion persisted through later childhood and
into adolescence, ultimately impairing his developing ability to cope adequately with
more complex emotional and cognitive states in adolescence. Donnie's social
isolation and alienation is likely to have led to his focus on his internal world and the
subsequent development of voices as a substitute for the peer group he did not have.
His one unsuccessful attempt at forming a meaningful relationship with another
reinforces for him that others are unable to support him or that he is unable to elicit
their support ( DAS: dependency - "7 am nothing ifa person I love doesn't love me").
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The depressive and anxious core beliefs formed by his earlier experiences are then
"unlocked" (Parker et al., 1998) or confirmed (Power & Dalgliesh, 1997) by this
later stressful life event. Given that adolescents may have fewer mental models to
make sense of their experiences (Horowitz et al., 1991), it might be expected that
Donnie would find this experience stressful or traumatic, and that it would contribute
to his low mood.
This event, his rejection, anger and subsequent guilt are then repeatedly re-
experienced in terms of both intrusive thoughts and as auditory hallucinations. This
fits with Morrison and colleagues (2003) proposal that both psychosis and PTSD are
related types of reactions on a spectrum of responses to trauma. As regards traumatic
symptomatology, Donnie reports a level of avoidant symptoms which are in line with
the average for young people with psychosis, whereas his level of intrusive
symptoms is twice the mean. There may be a dynamic between his thoughts and
those experiences he regards as voices, such that one activates the other and vice
versa. The content of self-loathing, rejection, and anger is similar in both. If Donnie
experiences his voices berating him, he tends to acquiesce to their negative
comments, and if he experiences distressing intrusive thoughts of his traumatic
experience, he then experiences the voices confirming his negative view of himself.
Whether this process begins with intrusive thoughts or hearing voices, it contributes
to his emotional dysfunction. His unprocessed emotional experiences of loss, anger
and guilt are frequently replayed internally, but without strategies or others to help
process these feelings, they remain unresolved. Metacognitions, such as "It is bad to
think certain thoughts" and "7 will be punishedfor not controlling certain thoughts"
contribute to his high current level of emotional dysfunction. The standardised
measures of anxiety and depression indicate that he meets case-ness for both
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), as shown in Table 11.
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Table 11 - Comparison of Donnie's scores with the mean scores for the adolescent onset group
Donnie's scores Adolescent onset group
Means ± S.D.
PBIQ composite score 42 36.89 ±7.34 (N=26)
RSQ total score 65 63.23 ±3.88 (N=26)
RSQ category Tends towards integration -
Traumatic Event Psychotic episode -
IES avoidance 15 14.87 ± 10.37 (N=24)
IES intrusion 29 14.33 ± 10.12
HADS anxiety 10 8.36 ± 4.60 (N=25)
HADS depression 8 5.52 ±3.51
DAS dependency 15 32.40 ± 7.34 (N=25)
MCQ: total score 88 67.40 ± 16.22 (N=24)
In summary
It is beyond the scope of the present case study to attempt to explain causal
relationships. However, it does suggest that, for Donnie, depressive and anxious
core beliefs are associated with negative beliefs about illness although not with a
sealing over recovery style. Despite his depressive and anxious core beliefs,
traumatic symptomatology and current emotional dysfunction, Donnie's recovery
style was that of tending towards integration. Thus is would seem that the
relationship between core beliefs and recovery style is not straightforward, and
possible reasons for this generally are discussed in the following chapter.
Donnie's depression and integrating recovery style is congruent with Jackson and
colleagues (2001) findings that higher levels of emotional dysfunction are associated
with integrating earlier on in recovery. The authors suggest that integrating leads to
increased insight. This would involve the acknowledgment of the difficulties, such
as loss and stigma, that are often associated with psychosis, and it might be that it is
this realisation that leads to depression.
However, such reasoning may be too simplistic. Certainly for Donnie, it does not
take account of his previous stressful life experiences, which shaped his core beliefs;
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his high levels of current avoidant and intrusive traumatic symptomatology related to
the onset of psychosis; and his continuing negotiation of adolescence, with its
concomitant pressures, all of which are likely to have an impact on his emotional
functioning, with or without regard to his recovery style. Although Donnie's case
may not clarify the causal nature of the various pathways and relationships of factors
pertinent to understanding people's experience of psychosis, it does illustrate
possible connections, some of which are tested empirically in the present study.
Donnie's case also highlights the sheer complexity of factors which may be
encountered in adolescent onset psychosis and indicates the utility of a
developmental psychopathological approach to understanding psychosis.
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Chapter 5 - Discussion
In this chapter, the research hypotheses are first examined, with regard to both the
present results and those of previous research. The methodological limitations are
discussed with reference to their impact on the present research and how these
difficulties might be ameliorated in future research. Finally, the conclusions of the
present research are presented.
5.1 - Implications of present findings and comparison with
previous research
As stated in section 3.4, the null hypotheses, that there are no differences between
groups with regard to the beliefs about illness, recovery style, traumatic symptoms,
emotional dysfunction and depressive and anxious core beliefs, cannot be rejected
for hypotheses 1 to 4. The implications of these findings and comparisons with
previous research are presented in sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.5.
5.1.1 - Hypothesis 1 - Beliefs about psychosis
The PBIQ composite score, measuring individuals' negative beliefs about illness,
was not found to differ significantly between the two groups. As mentioned
previously, past research has focussed on investigating the subscales of the PBIQ
rather than the composite score. However, summing the means of the subscales
reported by Birchwood and colleagues (1993) gives composite scores (depressed
subsample (N=18): 41.1; non-depressed subsample (N=66): 32.5) similar to those of
the present study (adolescent onset: 36.89 + 7.34; adult onset: 38.12 + 5.77). In the
present study, the low internal consistency of the subscales of the PBIQ indicates that
they are not representative of the factors which Birchwood and colleagues (1993)
report. It is possible that the sample size of the present study was not large enough to
fully investigate the internal consistency of the PBIQ and it is for this reason, rather
than underlying difficulties with the scale itself, which gives rise to the current
findings of the scale's unreliability. However, the original authors' (1993) factor
analysis of the PBIQ indicates that the subscales have less than optimal internal
consistency and, moreover, 3 of the 5 subscales, with less than 4 items per scale,
have too few items to be regarded as reliable factors (Cronbach, 1984). The
composite score, on the other hand, has good internal consistency, which indicates
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that, overall, the PBIQ measures a reliable construct, namely individuals' beliefs
about their experience of psychosis. It may be that there are other more reliable
factors within it that further research using exploratory factor analyses might
uncover, although a considerably larger sample than that of both the present study
and Birchwood's (1993: N=84) would be required.
That the original formulation of hypothesis 1, looking at beliefs regarding loss and
entrapment, could not be investigated prevents conclusions being drawn about
whether there are differences between adolescent and adult onset psychosis with
regard to these specific beliefs. The proposal of differences between present loss
versus future loss amongst adults and adolescents remains an important unanswered
question, which the more general reformulation of hypothesis 1 may not have been
sufficiently sensitive to address. As proposed in the introduction, actual losses of the
external and material, such as career, accommodation or relationship, on which
individuals' notion of self may rest, may be more significant, or at least different,
losses from those of adolescents. There is overlap between the two groups, with
adolescents also potentially experiencing actual losses, of relationships and so forth.
However, given the developmental stage of adolescence, where a number of major
life decisions are being, or will shortly be, made, it is often the loss of anticipated
future which young people face most acutely. With reference to the case study in
Chapter 4, it is possible that Donnie's thoughts about how psychosis frustrated his
aspirations for the future may have been an important yet un-accessed factor in his
beliefs about illness. Although the construct of beliefs about illness or psychosis as a
whole is legitimate, the internal structure of the scale and its proposed component
factors require investigation. In addition to losses of social role and autonomy -
which is a task of adolescence in itself - it may be worthwhile to broaden the
construct to account for the loss of anticipated future which may be particularly
pertinent for some young people.
5.1.2 - Hypothesis 2 - Recovery style
Unlike the findings of the original authors and others (e.g. Rooke & Birchwood,
1998), recovery style was not found to be bimodally distributed in the present
sample. On the contrary, individuals' responses were found to be normally
distributed, the most common recovery style being "tends towards integration" in
both groups. Given the present findings, the use of the RSQ as a continuous,
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normally distributed variable rather than a categorical, bimodal variable is warranted.
Although Thompson and colleagues (2003) point out that it is not yet known whether
the RSQ consists of interval level data, Clark-Carter (1997) proposes that if a
variable is ordinal but has at least 20 or more levels within it, then, as long as the
other parametric requirements are met, it is considered legitimate to conduct
parametric tests on the data. The RSQ total has 39 possible levels and, as stated in
the Results chapter, it is this measure of recovery style that was investigated using
inferential statistical analyses. Given the exploratory nature of the use of the
measure in this manner, and also its less than ideal internal consistency, results
presented and conclusions drawn should be interpreted with caution.
Notwithstanding these caveats, no significant differences were found between the
adult and adolescent onset groups with regard to recovery style.
It would appear that the contention, oft cited (e.g. Drayton et al., 1998; McGlashan,
1987), that recovery style is a bimodal construct, people either seal over or integrate
their experience of psychosis, is open to question. With both groups, a sizable
proportion of people (35% and 30% for adolescent and adult onset respectively) had
a recovery style characterised as a mixed picture with integration predominating.
Possible avenues for further research of this are outlined below.
5.1.3 - Hypothesis 3 - Trauma & emotional dysfunction
Emotional dysfunction
Scores on the anxiety (adolescent onset: 8.36 + 4.60; adult onset: 8.88 + 5.70) and
depression (adolescent onset: 5.52 + 3.51; adult onset: 8.29 + 6.14) subscales of the
HADS are comparable with Jackson and colleagues' (2004) research which
investigated a sample of 35 individuals (mean age: 25.8 years + 5.09, range 18-35)
18 months after their first episode of psychosis sample. These authors do not report
results for their sample as a whole, but rather as two sub-samples: those who post
first episode of psychosis meet the criteria for PTSD (anxiety: 9.5 + 5.4; depression:
7.4 + 4.7), and those who do not (anxiety: 6.1 + 3.4; depression: 6.8 + 4.4).
As PTSD symptoms were not a focus of the present study direct comparison with
previous research is not possible. Given that there is a high incidence of the
experience of trauma and consequent traumatic symptomatology in the present
samples, that the levels of anxiety for both adults and adolescents are between those
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of Jackson and colleagues' PTSD and non-PTSD groups is in line with that which
would be expected.
As consistently demonstrated in the research literature, there is a high incidence of
depression and anxiety amongst people with psychosis. The original authors indicate
that a cut-off of 8 points is indicative of possible case-ness (Zigmond & Snaith,
1983). The mean anxiety rating for both adolescent and adult onset is above this, as
is the mean rating for depression amongst adult onset psychosis. As Birchwood
(2003) suggests, emotional dysfunction remains a significant part of psychosis, and
the present study supports the notion that it is problematic post psychotic episode.
Trauma
Research has indicated that the incidence of trauma exposure or PTSD among people
with psychosis has been under-recognised. Mueser and colleagues (1998) found the
rate of PTSD to be 43% in their sample of 275 people with severe mental illness, but
only 3% of people had such a diagnosis in their medical notes. While PTSD as a
diagnosis was not investigated in the present study, the findings that 92% of young
people and 88% of those with adult onset psychosis reported having experienced
traumatic events is similar to the high incidence (98%) reported by Mueser and
colleagues (1998). Scores on the intrusion (adolescent onset: 14.87 + 10.37; adult
onset: 15.93 + 12.00) and avoidance (adolescent onset: 14.33 + 10.12; adult onset:
11.60 + 8.33) subscales of the IES in the present two groups are similar to those
found in Jackson and colleagues (2004) recent research, which revealed high levels
of intrusion (12.7 + 8.8) and avoidance (15.0 + 9.9). Thus the present research
findings indicate that the experience of trauma and continued experiencing of
traumatic symptomatology are common amongst people with psychosis.
Following Horowitz's (1986) notion of person schemas, it was proposed that,
possessing fewer mental models and thus having more limited coping strategies,
adolescents would report higher levels of depression, anxiety and traumatic
symptomatology than those whose onset was in adulthood. This is not supported by
the present research, which indicates that there were no significant differences
between the two groups with regard to the incidence of depression, anxiety or
traumatic symptomatology. However, the descriptive statistics do indicate that there
are greater, albeit non-significant, levels of avoidant traumatic symptomatology in
adolescent onset psychosis. This is not unrelated to Horowitz's notion, as it was
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proposed that as a result of fewer strategies or mental models, younger people would
adopt denial as means of coping. Avoidant strategies are very much inline with
denial of difficulties.
Reviewing different pathways of psychosis and trauma
The present research did not set out to systematically investigate Morrison and
colleagues' (2003) three pathways of psychosis and trauma, however the current
findings shed the following light. It is difficult to gauge the incidence of previous
stressful life events prior to the onset of psychosis as this was not directly measured,
furthermore the causal nature of this event with psychosis is beyond the scope of this
study. However, two participants in each group stated in the IES that their stressful
life event was bereavement, another participant childhood bullying and a further
participant previous suicide attempts. From a stress diathesis perspective it seems
reasonable to conclude that these life events and the resulting trauma may, for some
people, be factors leading to the onset of psychosis.
With regard to PTSD in response to the trauma of psychosis, the present findings
show that the most frequently cited traumatic event described by both groups was the
experience of psychosis, followed by admission to hospital. This indicates that, for
some people, the experience of psychosis, and its treatment, are indeed sufficient to
result in traumatic symptomatology. Further research investigating those factors that
contribute to psychosis or its treatment being experienced as a trauma by some
individuals is clearly valuable. In order to facilitate better adjustment to and
recovery from psychosis, services need to be aware of potential iatrogens, such as
detention or compulsory medications, in order to minimise and manage the risk of
trauma as a result of the experience of psychosis.
The third pathway Morrison and colleagues (2003) suggest, that psychosis and
intrusive and/or avoidant symptomatology are related types of responses to trauma, is
not addressed through the quantitative research in the present study, but, as described
in chapter 4, trauma may result in a complex interplay between intrusive thoughts
and psychotic symptomatology.
An integrative model, which accounts for the various pathways, proposes that:
... traumatic experiences contribute to the development of faulty self and social
knowledge and the (potentially psychotic) nature of interpretations of
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intrusions... Problematic, culturally unacceptable interpretations, and the
associated distress and disability... may be triggered by [later] memories of
[earlier] trauma, in addition to current trauma [including, presumably, psychosis]
(Morrison et al., 2003, p.344).
It seems reasonable to conclude that earlier experiences, including traumata, form the
basis for core beliefs, which people use to make sense of the world. It is possible
that the "culturally unacceptable interpretations" - referred to diagnostically as
delusional beliefs - that result from people's meaning making of their experiences
may be triggered by memories of earlier trauma and/or present stressful events.
Stressful events may trigger earlier memories of adversity which lead to psychosis,
as Parker's (1997) argument would suggest, or be sufficient in themselves to result in
psychotic symptomatology.
In effect, the integrative model endeavours to account for two types of traumata,
early adverse experiences and current stressful life events. However, it is possible
that there are different psychological processes underlying the two - earlier
experiences of trauma may lead to underlying vulnerabilities to psychological
dysfunction, whereas the processes underlying the experience of psychosis as a
trauma may be that of adjustment and adaptation. It may be that rather than different
pathways with the same underlying psychological processes, an integrative model of
trauma and psychosis may look to account for individual's adjustment and adaptation
to the present trauma in addition to their latent vulnerabilities as a result of earlier
experiences. For example, the case study of Donnie shows that he experienced
trauma during his childhood, the impact of which is likely to have had a formative
influence on his perceptions of self and the world, and also his interpretation of later
stressful events. However, he was also adjusting to the experience of psychosis,
which was intricately interwoven with his experiences of adolescence. It may be
worthwhile to separate the two types of trauma conceptually, in order to better
understand individuals' past and current experiences of and adjustment to trauma.
5.1.4 - Hypothesis 4 - Core beliefs
As stated in section 3.4, neither anxious nor depressive core beliefs were found to be
significantly greater in adult onset psychosis compared to adolescent onset psychosis.
With regard to the incidence of depressive core beliefs in other clinical samples, the
present results are very much in line with those reported by Power and colleagues
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(1995) for a sample of currently depressed individuals, as shown in Table 12. As
regards anxious core beliefs, the scores of the two groups in the present study are
generally higher than that of the general population, with the exception of adult onset
positive beliefs about worry. For comparison, present findings and Wells and
Cartwright-Hatton's (2004) original findings, using a convenience sample of student,
university and health service employee participants, are displayed in Table 12.
Table 12 - Comparison of descriptive statistics for DAS-24 & MCQ-30 with previous research
Adolescent Onset Adult Onset Previous Research
Mean± S.D. Mean± S.D. Mean± S.D.
DAS: achievement 34.68 ±9.19 (N=25) 34.98 ± \2.7S(N=17) 32.6 ±10.6 (N=19f
DAS: dependency 32.40 ±7.34 33.59 ± 11.05 35.2 ±9.8
DAS: self-control 29.80 ± 10.17 33.24 ± 10.56 33.5 ±8.2
DAS: total score 96.88 ± 19.50 101.76 ±31.16 101.3 ±24.3
MCQ: cognitive confidence 13.52 ±4.46 (N=25) 11.76 ±4.66 (N-17) 9.51 ± 4.06 (N-182)b
MCQ: positive beliefs about worry 10.92 ±4.94 (N=24) 9.06 ± 4.63 9.60 ± 3.46
MCQ: cognitive self consciousness 16.29 ±5.43 15.06 ±6.08 11.65 ±4.68
MCQ: negative beliefs about
uncontrollable thoughts & danger
13.13 ±5.56 14.65 ±7.31 9.30 ±4.00
MCQ: total score 67.40 ± 16.22 62.71 ± 18.42 48.41 ± 13.31
a Power et al., 1995; b Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004
The proposal that young people would have less anxious and depressive underlying
schemata, given their less formed core beliefs compared to the more crystallised
beliefs of those whose onset of psychosis is in adulthood, does not appear to hold.
The experience of psychosis may have a major negative impact on young people's
developing core beliefs and thus this would account for the absence of significant
differences between the two groups. It would be useful to assess this prospectively,
to investigate the extent to which core beliefs change as a result of psychotic
episodes. It could be, as Power and Dalgliesh (1997) suggest, that they are in fact
confirmed, and that, acting as a trigger, psychosis activates latent maladaptive
anxious and depressive core beliefs, which are themselves the result of earlier
adversities common amongst people with psychosis. Before embarking on a
longitudinal prospective investigation, it could be that more sensitive or specific
measures would tap into particular core beliefs than those employed here. Future
research may wish to include a more qualitative interview approach to facilitate
further understanding of the core beliefs of people with either adult or adolescent
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onset psychosis, particularly in light of the relationship with beliefs about illness
discussed in the following section.
5.1.5 - Hypothesis 5 - Predictors of beliefs about illness and
recovery style
Personal beliefs about illness
Although core beliefs and traumatic and depressive symptomatology were found to
be associated with personal beliefs about illness, only current level of anxiety was
found to be a significant predictor of illness beliefs. Removing current anxiety from
the model indicated that both anxious and depressive core beliefs, in the form of
dependency, were approaching being significantly predictive of beliefs about illness.
Although multicollinearity was not found to be problematic with regard to its effect
on the regression coefficient, further post hoc analysis indicates that current anxiety,
dependency and anxious core beliefs are significantly correlated with one another, as
shown in Table 13.
Table 13 - One tailed Pearson's r correlations of HADS: anxiety subscale, MCQ: total score and
DAS: dependency subscale
HADS: anxiety score MCQ: total score
DAS: dependency r -0.510 -0.508
Significance p<0.01 p<0.01
N 42 41
HADS: anxiety r - 0.604
Significance - .p < 0.01
N - 41
Thus at a statistical level there is much shared variance (approximately 25 and 36%)
between the three. This means that including more than one of these three factors is
unlikely to contribute significantly to the regression model, as was found to be the
case. It also makes sense at a conceptual level: given that the Metacognitions
Questionnaire is a measure which is constructed to taps into individuals' anxious
core beliefs of worry and anxiety, it is likely to be associated with current levels of
anxiety. Cohen and colleagues (2003) suggest that this "moderate multicollinearity"
- where multicollinearity is not statistically significant but may be sufficient to
confuse interpretation of the regression model - can be overcome by careful
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selection of predictor variables. This could be done by combining variables that
measure the same underlying construct, or by excluding variables, having ensured
that they do not make an important contribution to the model. Selecting predictor
variables based on their relationship to theoretical constructs, as described in section
2.6, may help to avoid difficulties of moderate multicollinearity and lead to clearer
relationships between predictor and criterion variables. Given the present results,
one fruitful avenue of future research may be to investigate the relationship between
core beliefs and current levels of anxiety. It would be especially useful to be able to
identify anxious vulnerability factors. Evidence suggests that dependency is a
depression-specific vulnerability factor (Power et al., 1994; 1995), and it may be that
content-specific subscales arising from further investigation of metacognitions and
current anxiety can tap into anxious vulnerability factors.
Although the sample size here may not have been sufficient to demonstrate this,
there are indications that anxious and depressive core beliefs may have an important
role in people's adjustment to psychosis. The literature regarding metacognitive
beliefs and generalised anxiety disorder shows clear links between the two (e.g.
Wells, 2000). The same processes may account for anxiety amongst people with
psychosis and thus there might well be suitable applications of existing cognitive
behavioural therapeutic interventions with this client group. Similarly, depressive
core beliefs, of dependency in particular, may be a significant factor in determining
beliefs about illness, and adds a further theme to Fowler and colleagues' (1995)
common dysfunctional assumptions in psychosis as summarised in section 1.5.
Addressing these - again the evidence supports cognitive behavioural strategies (e.g.
French & Morrison, 2003) - may promote less negative beliefs about illness and
subsequent adjustment to the experience of psychosis.
Recovery Style
That recovery style is not associated with any of these factors is both unexpected and
of interest. This could be to due to methodological factors, the measures used in this
study not being sensitive enough to pick up those aspects of individuals' beliefs
about themselves and the world that determine recovery style. Alternatively, core
beliefs, emotional dysfunction and traumatic symptomatology are not related in any
way to recovery style. It may well be that there are other more important factors
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which determine recovery style - utilisation of social support, high levels of
intrafamilial expressed emotion, for example - but are not investigated in this study.
Before abandoning the potential roles of the hypothesised predictive variables,
however, it may be worth investigating these constructs using other means. The
investigation of recovery style as a continuous normally distributed variable, as
opposed to a dichotomous bi-modal variable, is novel. The Recovery Style
Questionnaire (Drayton et al., 1998) itself was the product of a semi-structured
interview (ISOS: McGlashan, 1976), which proposed the bimodality of the recovery
style construct. It may be time to review the concept of recovery. An increasing
number of studies report findings contrary to those of the original authors (e.g. Tait
et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2003). From a historical perspective, the RSQ is the
result of a measure which places psychosis very much in a medical illness paradigm,
as does the PBIQ to some extent. Given that a number of current, and successful,
interventions espouse a normalisation model for psychosis (e.g. McGorry et al.,
1995; French & Morrison, 2003) rather than that of a severe and enduring mental
illness, it may be that the concept of recovery, and beliefs about psychosis, are
broader, multidimensional concepts than was previously thought. It may be
worthwhile to return to qualitative means, without the assumptions of bimodality and
enduring personality traits, in order to more fully understand people's experiences of
and recovery from psychosis. Given the importance of integrating the experience of
psychosis for longer term outcome (e.g. Tait et al., 2003), it remains a crucial task to
identify those factors which may be predictive of this, and for services to provide
support or intervention where necessary.
5.2 - Methodological Limitations
5.2.1 - Implications of small sample sizes; reduction in statistical
power
Fewer participants were recruited than anticipated, especially with regard to the adult
onset psychosis group. This has ramifications for the statistical analyses of the
studies in that the small sample sizes result in a loss of statistical power. It is
possible that had more participants been recruited significant differences may have
been found between the groups with regard to the research hypotheses.
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5.2.2 - Implications of small sample sizes: selective sampling?
In addition to the lack of statistical power, the small sample sizes, again especially
that of the adult onset sample, raise the question as to whether the present samples
accurately represent those with adolescent and adult onset psychosis. It was much
harder to recruit participants to the adult onset group than anticipated, thus, as
detailed in the methodology section, a number of avenues were pursued in order to
maximise the number of participants.
From an epidemiological perspective, there are a large number of potential
participants within the geographical area covered by NHS Lothian. Rough
calculations based on a population of approximately 500, 000, of whom 1 in 100 of
whom will experience psychosis at some point in their lifetime (Jablensky, 1997)
with 20-50% doing so in adulthood (Sartorius et al., 1986) suggest that there are
between 1000-2500 people who would be eligible for the present study.
Not all these individuals are under the care of mental health services, which reduces
the number of potential participants for this study. Furthermore, due to constraints of
time and other resources only half of the teams who provide services were
approached in order to identify clients who may be willing to participate in the
present research. That said, the present author met with over 40 staff on a number of
occasions to discuss the purposes of the research and ways in which to identify and
recruit clients to the study.
Despite the promising potential numbers, the following may account for the lack of
actual adult onset participants. Firstly, although the proposal of the present research
was generally well received by community mental health teams, in line with Harrop
and Trower's (2003) findings, these services are generally overstretched.
Consequently, despite best intentions, recruiting participants for a research project in
which the team has no direct investment is not a high priority given the high
workload which staff have to manage. On the advice of the teams themselves and
given time constraints, the researcher took on a more passive role of being informed
of clients who might fit research criteria or be willing to participate. In order to
avoid difficulties in participant recruitment in future studies, the researcher may
have to take on a more active role in identifying potential participants, rather than the
passive role of being informed of clients who might be appropriate candidates for
participation.
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Secondly, a greater number of individuals declined to participate in the adult onset
group compared to the adolescent onset group. It is unknown whether there are
common reasons for this non-participation. However, an anonymous letter sent to
the author by one adult onset non-participant described the frustration at being asked
to fill in yet more questionnaires which completely failed to capture his experiences
of psychosis and only served to bring up painful memories. This latter point was
echoed by another adult onset non-participant. Although caution should be taken in
generalising on the basis of limited evidence, these comments suggest that these
individuals may have sought to encapsulate their experiences of psychosis, and,
having sealed it over, do not wish to revisit it. It is possible that those who did not
participate may have had a tendency for sealing over recovery styles, which would
go some way to explaining the lack of this recovery style in the present findings.
Related to both recovery style and non-participation is keyworkers' selection of
potential participants. In the adolescent onset sample, all young people who were
seen by EPSS were approached, unless their difficulties prevented them participating
or would have been exacerbated by participating, for the reasons outlined in section
2.4.3. Only one declined to participate, giving no reason. In the adult onset sample,
keyworkers selected those clients who they regarded as likely to participate. This
may have been dependent on clients' engagement with services. A sealing over
recovery style has been found to associated with considerably lower service
engagement (Tait et al., 2003), thus it could be that those who were not approached,
possibly due to lower engagement with services, in addition to those who declined to
participate, may have had sealing over recovery styles. This may account for the
lack of sealing over found in the adult onset group. The unknown refusal rate does
not clarify this issue - it would have been useful to have kept a record of those
approached but who declined, as was done with the adolescent onset sample.
5.2.3 - Recovery style In the adolescent group
These reasons do not account for the lack of sealing over amongst the adolescent
onset group, however. As the descriptive statistics indicate, only 3 young people had
a tendency to seal over. Further inquiry reveals that two of these three had only
recently experienced their first episode of psychosis. Sealing over has been shown to
be a useful and adaptive response in the early stages of adjustment to psychosis (e.g.
Jackson & Iqbal, 2000) which may account for two of these responses. Furthermore,
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all of the young people seen by EPSS participate or have participated in psychosocial
group interventions, have individual clinical psychological input, are in regular
contact with community psychiatric nurses and/or psychiatrists. Thus, they tend to be
engaged with services. Engagement, and the opportunity for support and
intervention which it affords, is associated with a more integrative recovery style
(Tait et al., 2003). This may therefore account for the lack of sealing over found in
the adolescent onset sample.
Furthermore, given that recovery style is associated with better outcome, the present
findings of the near universal integration recovery style among young people with
psychosis could provide support for the benefits of early intervention in adolescent
onset psychosis. There is debate about whether the current increase in service
provision for individuals with severe mental health problems should be directed
toward early psychosis - some question the evidence for intervention at this critical
period, and regard early intervention as a drain on the budgets of generic community
services (see Pelosi & Birchwood (2003) for discussion). While it is clear that
resources are required for all services, and therefore it should and need not be a
competition between services, the evidence for early intervention is only
accumulating. Reviewing the literature, French and Morrison (2003) summarise its
four potential benefits: less resistance and better attitudes towards treatment; more
rapid and complete remission; a lower level of family burden; and improved
recovery.
In the present study, the absence of sealing over beyond initial adjustment phases in
the earlier onset group may well be testament to the effectiveness of early
intervention. Given the greater fluidity of recovery style than originally thought (e.g.
McGlashan, 1987), Thomson and colleague's (2003) proposal that "psychoeducation
and other therapeutic strategies may be appropriate interventions especially in the
early phase of illness" (p.35, emphasis added) appears to be borne out by the findings
in the adolescent onset sample. Quilliams and Addington (2003) argue that
knowledge about the facts of psychosis alone leads neither to more positive beliefs
about illness nor to improved outcome. However, their study did not investigate the
individualised meaning that people make when presented with the facts, as it were, of
psychosis. It is possible that exploring with clients the impact on their well-being of
adhering to prescribed medication regimens, or using cannabis for that matter, may
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lead to more positive beliefs about illness than simply offering information on the
pros and cons of medication and recreational drug use. This might most usefully be
accomplished through psychotherapeutic input, be it in the form of psychosocial
group interventions (e.g. Francey, 1999) or individual CBT approaches (e.g. French
& Morrison, 2003). Focussing on the meaning individuals make of their experiences
is key to promoting recovery in young people with psychosis.
5.3- Conclusions
The present study sought to investigate the roles of adult versus adolescent onset,
core beliefs, emotional dysfunction and traumatic symptomatology in adjustment to
psychosis. The two best available options for assessing adjustment, given the design
of the study, were employed. However, the Personal Beliefs about Illness
Questionnaire (Birchwood et al., 1993) was found to have an unreliable internal
structure in the present sample. The second measure, Recovery Style Questionnaire
(Drayton et ah, 1998), was employed as a continuous rather than discrete variable, in
the light of recent research (Thompson et ah, 2003) and the present findings, and thus
remains to be validated. Accordingly results should be interpreted with caution.
Further research exploring further the utility of both measures and the underlying
constructs that they purport to measure is warranted so as to better understand
people's experiences of psychosis and their subsequent adjustment.
The present research indicates that current anxiety is the best predictor of beliefs
about illness, however, there is also an indication of a further model highlighting the
roles of anxious and depressive core beliefs. The case of Donnie further emphasises
this relationship, which clearly warrants further investigation, and some directions
for this are proposed above.
Recovery style remains to be more fully understood. Given its importance for long
term outcome, it warrants further research, both with those factors proposed here and
with other mediators posited to have an influence on adjustment to psychosis, such as
utilisation of social support, self concept and family dynamics.
It would be premature to conclude that, as no significant differences were found
between adult and adolescent onset psychosis with regard to the measured variables,
there are no differences between the two. The case of Donnie highlights the
importance and utility of a developmental psychopathology perspective, which takes
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into account both the developmental stage of an individual and his or her previous
life experiences. Psychological interventions in psychosis and particularly early
onset psychosis are currently a focus of much research interest (see McGorry (2004)
for review) but in some respects remain relatively uncharted waters. In order to
maximise the understanding of the experience of early onset psychosis and thus
inform intervention, it may be beneficial to make use of more qualitative research
methodologies. Series of case studies, exploring Harrop and Trower's theory of
disordered adolescent development and other psychological models of psychosis,
may be crucial steps to determining the best and most fruitful routes for large scale
nomothetic research with generalisable results. Increased understanding of
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Appendix






Title of project: An investigation into how people think and feel
about the experience of psychosis
Introduction
I am looking at the experiences of people with psychosis, in particular
how they think and feel about their experiences. One of the aims of the
study is to help develop ways that will improve care for mental health
problems.
What is involved?
If you decide that you want to take part in the study, either I or your
keyworker will ask you to complete some questionnaires. This will take
about 45 minutes.
This study is entirely voluntary and although I hope that you will be happy
to take part there is no obligation to do so. You have as long as you need
to decide whether to take part in the study. If at any time you feel
uncomfortable with participating in the study you can withdraw at any
time. Not taking part will in no way influence your current or future
treatment.
All the information you give will be confidential and anonymous. All
the questionnaires will be identified by a research number, not by name,
and all records will be kept in a locked filing cabinet.
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP
If you have any further questions, please contact:









Telephone: 0131 537 6364 Telephone: 0131 537 6364
Consent form
Title of project: An investigation into how people think and feel
about the experience of psychosis
PERMISSION OF PARTICIPANT
I have read the information sheet and consent form and have had the opportunity to ask
questions about them.
I give permission for the researcher to inform my GP of my participation in this study.
I understand that whether I participate or not will have no bearing on my treatment.
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any stage.
I agree to participate in this study.
Signature of respondent
Date








Telephone: 0131 537 6364
Personal Information Sheet
Please write down answers to the following questions.
How old are you?
Are you male or female?
How old were you when you had
your first episode of psychosis?
How long ago is it since your last
episode of psychosis?


















The Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire
Written below is a list of statements about your illness.
Please read them carefully and circle how much you agree or disagree with them.
My illness frightens me
I find it difficult to cope with my current
symptoms
I am powerless to influence or control my illness
If I am going to relapse, there is nothing I can do
about it
There must always have been something wrong
with me as a person (to have caused this illness)
I am fundamentally normal, my illness is like
any other
There is something about my personality that
causes my illness
There is something strange about me which is
responsible for my illness
I will always need to be cared for by
professional staff
I am capable of very little as a result ofmy
illness
My illness is too brittle or delicate for me to
work or keep a job
I am embarrassed by my illness
My illness is a judgement on me
I can talk to most people about my illness
Society needs to keep people like me who have
this illness, apart from everyone else


































































The Recovery Style Questionnaire
Written below is a list of statements about your illness.
Please read them carefully and circle whether you agree or disagree.
1 There was a gradual build-up to me becoming ill Agree Disagree
2 My illness is not part ofmy personality Agree Disagree
3 I am responsible for what I think when I am ill Agree Disagree
4 I am not interested in my illness Agree Disagree
5 My illness taught me new things about myself Agree Disagree
6 I need help to solve the problems caused by my illness Agree Disagree
7 My illness was caused by my difficulties in coping with life Agree Disagree
8 I have had a nervous breakdown Agree Disagree
9 I can see positive aspects ofmy illness Agree Disagree
10 My illness has had a strong impact on my life Agree Disagree
11 I am not frightened ofmental illness Agree Disagree
12 I liked some of the experiences I had when 1 was ill Agree Disagree
13 My illness has helped me find a more satisfying life Agree Disagree
14 My illness came on suddenly and went suddenly Agree Disagree
15 My illness is part ofme Agree Disagree
16 I am not responsible for my actions when I am ill Agree Disagree
17 I am curious about my illness Agree Disagree
18 I understand myself better because ofmy illness Agree Disagree
19 I can manage the problems caused by my illness, alone Agree Disagree
20 Others are to blame for my illness Agree Disagree
21 I have had a medical illness Agree Disagree
22 Nothing good came from my illness Agree Disagree
23 My illness has had little effect on my life Agree Disagree
24 I am frightened ofmental illness Agree Disagree
25 I didn't like any of the unusual experiences I had when I was ill Agree Disagree
26 It's hard to find satisfaction with life since I was ill Agree Disagree
27 My illness came on very suddenly Agree Disagree
28 My illness is alien to me Agree Disagree
29 I am responsible for my thoughts and feelings when I am ill Agree Disagree
30 I don't care about my illness, now that I am well Agree Disagree
31 I want to be the person I was before my illness Agree Disagree
32 Others can help me solve my problems Agree Disagree
33 My illness was caused by stress in my life Agree Disagree
34 I have suffered an emotional breakdown Agree Disagree
35 Being ill had good parts too Agree Disagree
36 I'm not really interested in my illness Agree Disagree
37 I liked some of the unusual ideas I had when I was ill Agree Disagree
38 My life is more satisfying since my illness Agree Disagree
39 My attitude to mental illness is better now, than before I was ill Agree Disagree
Impact of Event Scale
On , you experienced.
(date) (life event, for example: hospital admission, psychotic episode)
Below is a list of comments made by people after stressful life events. Please read each
comment carefully and circle how true each one was for you during the past week. If they
did not occur at all during that time, please circle "not at all".
1 I thought about it when I didn't mean to Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
2 I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about
it or was reminded by it
Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
3 I tried to remove it from my memory Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
4 I had trouble falling asleep, because ofpictures or
thoughts about it that came into my mind
Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
5 I had waves of strong feelings about it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
6 I had dreams about it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
7 I stayed away from reminders of it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
8 I felt as if it hadn't happened or it wasn't real Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
9 I tried not to talk about it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
10 Pictures about it popped into my mind Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
11 Other things kept making me think about it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
12 I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it, but I
didn't deal with them
Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
13 I tried not to think about it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
14 Any reminder brought back feelings about it Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
15 My feelings about it were kind of numb Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
HAPS
This questionnaire asks questions about how you feel.
Read each item below and underline the reply which comes closest to describing
how you have been feeling in the past week.
Don't take too long over your replies, your immediate reaction to each item will
probably be more accurate than a long, thought-out response.
I feel tense or wound up
Most of the time
A lot of the time
From time to time, occasionally
Not at all
I feel as if I am slowed down




I still enjoy things I used to enjoy
Definitely as much
Not quite so much
Only a little
Hardly at all
I get a sort of frightened feeling like





I get a sort of frightened feeling as if
something awful is about to happen
Very definitely and quite badly
Yes, but not too badly
A little, but it doesn't worry me
Not at all
I can laugh and see the funny side of things
As much as I always could
Not quite so much now
Definitely not so much now
Not at all











Worrying thoughts go through my mind
A great deal of the time







Most of the time
I look forward with enjoyment to things
As much as I ever did
Rather less than I used to
Definitely less than I used to
Hardly at all










I have lost interest in my appearance
Definitely
I don't take as much care as I should
I may not take quite as much care


























This scale lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold.
Please read each statement carefully and circle how much you agree or disagree with what it says.
To help you decide on your answer, simply keep in mind what you are like most of the time.








































People will probably think less ofme if













My happiness depends more on other





















































I ought to be able to solve my problems














If I don't set the highest standards for










































If I am to be a worthwhile person, I














If you don't have other people to lean













It is possible for a person to be scolded













I must be a useful, productive, creative













I can find happiness without being



























If I do not do well all the time, people













I do not need the approval of other













If I try hard enough, I should be able to













People who have good ideas are more













A person doesn't need to be well liked













Whenever I take a chance or risk, I am














This questionnaire is concerned with beliefs people have about their thinking.
Listed below are a number of beliefs that people expressed.
Please read each item and say how much you generally agree with it by circling
the appropriate number.
Please respond to all the items, there are no right or wrong answers.
1 I do not trust my memory 1 2 3 4
2 I have a poor memory 1 2 3 4
3 I have little confidence in my memory for actions 1 2 3 4
4 I have little confidence in my memory for places 1 2 3 4
5 I have little confidence in my memory for words and j
names
2 3 4
6 My memory can mislead me at times 1 2 3 4
7 Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my mind 1 2 3 4
8 Worrying helps me to cope 1 2 3 4
9 I need to worry in order to work well 1 2 3 4
10 Worrying helps me to solve problems 1 2 3 4
11 I need to worry in order to remain organised 1 2 3 4
12 Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future 1 2 3 4
13 I am constantly aware ofmy thinking 1 2 3 4
14 I pay close attention to the way my mind works 1 2 3 4
15 I think a lot about my thoughts 1 2 3 4
16 I constantly examine my thoughts 1 2 3 4
17 I monitor my thoughts 1 2 3 4
18 I am aware of the way my mind works when I am j
thinking through a problem
2 3 4
19 My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how I try to stop j
them
2 3 4
20 When I start worrying I cannot stop 1 2 3 4
21 I could make myself sick with woriying 1 2 3 4
22 I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts 1 2 3 4
23 My worrying could make me go mad 1 2 3 4
24 My worrying is dangerous for me 1 2 3 4
25 If I could not control my thoughts, I would not be able to j
function
2 3 4
26 Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of \
weakness
2 3 4
27 I should be in control ofmy thoughts all of the time 1 2 3 4
28 It is bad to think certain thoughts 1 2 3 4
29 If I did not control a worrying thought and then it j
happened, it would be my fault
2 3 4
30 I will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts 1 2 3 4
